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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
“What we have is two important values in direct conflict: freedom of speech and our
desire for healthy campaigns in a healthy democracy. You can’t have both.”
-Congressman Richard Gephardt1

Thesis Statement

Congressional attempts to enact reform in the financing of political campaigns

may unavoidably violate the First Amendment2 to the United States Constitution and

its guarantees of freedom of speech and association. As a result, the core issue that
must be resolved in the campaign finance reform debate is whether campaign finance

reform is unavoidably unconstitutional.

Both advocates (pro-reformists)3 and

opponents (anti-reformists)4 of campaign finance reform have been engaging in an
extended ad hoc debate over reform measures without adequately confronting the
critical core issue that continues to prevent key reform measures from being adopted:

does the First Amendment prohibit campaign finance reform?
Statement of the Problem
The process used by the American nation to elect political leaders naturally

lends itself to investigation by a political scientist.

An investigation may be

conducted on many different levels to gather both empirical data and normative

insights into the vitality of the American elections process to determine whether it is
1 Quoted in Nancy Gibbs. “The Wake-Up Call,” Time, February 3, 1997: 25.
2 When referring to the First Amendment, this thesis is concerned solely with the free speech
protection contained therein and. as will be discussed, some tangential concerns with the protection of
freedom of association that have developed since the time of adoption.
3 Examples of pro-reformist groups include Twentieth Century Fund, Common Cause, Public
Campaign and the Center for Responsive Politics.
4 Examples of anti-reformist groups include the American Civil Liberties Union and the National Right
to Life Committee.
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democratic and egalitarian in nature. Traditionally, an enduring tenet of American
political ideology has been the concept of an open, free and fair electoral process.

This tenet is based upon a notion of equality, and those chosen to exercise political

power and formulate public policy are theoretically selected by the citizenry at large
in a process embodied by the traditional refrain of “one person, one vote.”5 Perhaps

nowhere else in American society is the concept and ideal of equality given as much
value as it is in the elections mechanism employed by this country.
Presently, a great deal of debate is occurring in both academic and non

academic circles as to whether the reality of the American electoral process is at odds

with its traditional egalitarian ideology.

Many scholars, politicians and individual

citizens have concluded that the American electoral process is controlled by special
interests, and that the wealthy have a pronounced edge when it comes to deciding

who is to be elected to hold political office.6 As a result, reforming the process of
• •

•

•

campaign financing has become an enduring agenda item for political discussion.

7

The attention of the general public, academics, politicians and all concerned with the

5 One Supreme Court decision traced this concept of political equality back to the Declaration of
Independence, holding: “The conception of political equality from the Declaration of Independence...
can mean only one tiling—one person, one vote.” Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368. 381 (1963). See
also Alexander Heard, The Costs of Democracy (Chapel Hill: U of North Carolina P, 1960) 48.
6 “Most opinion surveys conducted in recent years show that from 70 to 90 percent of the public feel
that the system is broken, and significant majorities think that money has too much influence in our
political process.” See Anthony Corrado, Beyond the Basics: Campaign Finance Reform (New York:
The Century Foundation Press. 2000) 1.
7 Interestingly, one commentator identifies the first major congressional attempt to restrict campaign
financing as the passage of the 1907 Tillman Act (34 STAT. 864) prohibiting corporate and banking
contributions to federal candidates. The Tillman Act was upheld in a lower federal court challenge in
the case of United States v. United States Brewers Association. 239 F. 163 (W.D.Pa. 1916). The Court
holding cited a governmental interest in guarding elections from corruption. See Kenneth J. Levit.
“Campaign Finance Reform and the Return of Buckley v. Valeo,” The Yale Law Journal 103 (1993):
470. n. 4.
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American political elections process has made campaign finance reform an important

topic to analyze.
However, the bulk of research and commentary in the campaign finance
reform debate leaps past its core issue:

whether reform is constitutionally valid.

Instead, two distinct areas receive most of the scholarly attention: (1) whether reform
is needed, and if so, (2) what reform measures should be adopted.

Utilizing the

empirical data generated from the analysis of these two areas, reform debaters engage

in a dialogue either rejecting or supporting reform in general, and discussing both the

feasibility and effectiveness of various reform methods.

While this empirical

methodology is valuable, it overlooks the one impediment to congressional attempts
to enact key reform measures—the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of

the First Amendment and its continued adherence to the decision it rendered in the

landmark case of Buckley v. Valeo* (^Buckley”).

Pro-reformists view the Court’s Buckley decision as an impenetrable
roadblock limiting their ability to create a fair campaign process to select the leaders

of the American Nation.

They lament the fact that reform legislation has been

debated, passed into law and then invalidated by the Court. The Court’s adherence to
Buckley necessitates a continuation of the reform debate and creates an unending
cycle of contention pitting the legislative branch of government against the judicial

branch.

Pro-reformists endlessly criticize the Supreme Court for erecting judicial

obstacles that prevent them from remedying what they see as the corrosive influence

of special interest and big money in politics.

8 424 U.S. 1 (1976).

Conversely, anti-reformists see the

4

Supreme Court as the champion of free speech and the First Amendment and rise to
its defense in congressional hearings and public statements.

To break the endless cycle of reform and invalidation it is imperative that the

core issue of the reform debate—constitutional validity—be brought to the forefront

where it can be adequately examined and analyzed. It is only by taking a step back

through this kind of examination that the parameters of the reform debate will come
into focus, enabling it to go forward on a secure footing and in a cogent manner.
Thesis Approach
As discussed above, this thesis outlines the parameters of the campaign

finance reform debate by developing a First Amendment Campaign Finance Reform
Methodology that brings into focus the unresolved core issue concerning the
constitutional validity of reform measures. One scholar observed two decades ago,

when speaking of first amendment theory in a general sense, that “[a]n abundant first

amendment literature has failed to dispel the climate of uncertainty and intellectual
disorder that permeates [both] the concept and implementation of freedom of

speech.”9

Since the time of this scholar’s observation, and despite further

development of first amendment theory, this uncertainty and disorder continues to

exist, and it is perhaps in the area of campaign finance reform that it has become the
most apparent.10 In light of Buckley, this thesis posits that the only way an acceptable

9 Lillian R. BeVier, “The First Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry Into the Substance and
Limits of Principle,” Stanford Law Review 30 (1978) : 299.
10 As observed by Harry Jaffe, perhaps unfortunately for the goal of this thesis, “not only are there
different laws in different places at the same time, and different laws in the same place at different
times, but sometimes even what may be called the same law—e.g., the law of the Constitution of the
United States—may be said to differ at different times.” Harry V. Jaffa, Original Intent and the
Framers of the Constitution: A Disputed Question (Washington, D.C.: Regnery Publishing, 1994) 58.
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resolution will come about in the arena of campaign finance reform is by bringing

some degree of certainty and intellectual order to first amendment issues it raises. To
that end, this thesis builds upon a framework that has at its foundation this premise:

the primary means of defining and providing meaning to fundamental constitutional

provisions is by utilizing a normative approach that draws from political theory,
history, law, custom and tradition as its methodological tools.11
In the United States, the primary decision maker of constitutional meaning is
the United States Supreme Court, and it carved out its preeminence as the final arbiter

of constitutional interpretation long ago.12 The Court and the method by which it
makes its decisions is the lens through which this examination views campaign

finance reform.

This approach has been chosen because the Court will be the

ultimate arbiter of reform measures, and acting in this capacity it has not significantly

changed its interpretation of the First Amendment as it relates to free speech and

campaign finance reform since Buckley.

As a result, it is necessary for the participants in the reform debate to clearly
articulate their positions both as to the meaning of the First Amendment’s free speech
protection and as to the premises upon which those positions rest. Only then can the

11 This thesis proceeds from a point of view articulated well before the modem day reform debate, but
like many viewpoints on constitutional issues, it has continued viability, and is aptly reflected by the
following quotation: “...[T]he chief source of our blundering ineptness in dealing with moral and
political problems is that we do not know how to think about them except by quantitative methods. . . .
In this sense we need to be, not more scientific, but less scientific, not more quantitative but other than
quantitative. We must create and use methods of inquiry, methods of belief... [that]... are suitable to
the study of men as self-governing persons but not suitable to the study of forces or of machines. In
the understanding of a free society, scientific thinking has an essential part to play. But it is a
secondary' part. We shall not understand the Constitution of the United States if we think of men only
as pushed around by forces. We must see them also as governing themselves.” Alexander Meiklejohn,
Political Freedom: The Constitutional Powers of the People (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1979) 12.
12 See Marbury' v. Madison, 5 U.S. 1 Cranch 137 (1803), originally establishing the doctrine that it is
the courts, not the Congress, that decides whether a federal statute complies with the Constitution.

6

debate fully focus on the empirical issues of whether reform is needed and, if so, what
that reform might look like.

Those who find no constitutional conflict may then

genuinely disagree with the Supreme Court’s rulings and cogently argue in public
appeals that the Court is mistaken.13 Perhaps these arguments will find favor with

current or future members of the Court and eventually lead to a different
interpretation of the First Amendment.14 Conversely, if the participants in the reform

debate determine that the First Amendment is a roadblock to reform and the Court is

given its traditional and historical deference in constitutional questions, reform
advocates may proceed by attempting to amend the Constitution.
The campaign finance reform debate continues because it has not been

brought into focus and no clarity as to the meaning of first amendment speech
protection in the context of campaign finance reform has been achieved.

The

difficulty appears to be that pro-reformists see the campaign finance reform debate as

a question of policy whereas anti-reformists see it in terms of constitutional validity.
In any event, it is clear that the meaning of the First Amendment’s protection of free

speech as it applies to campaign finance reform must, of necessity, be determined by

either interpretation or amendment.15 Although the Court’s interpretation of the First

13 As aptly stated by one scholar in discussing the Supreme Court’s role in a first amendment context:
“,..[T]he Supreme Court, like any other teacher, may be wrong as well as right, may do harm as well
as good. . . . From time to time, their judgments are reconsidered and changed... [and although] we
must.. .abide by the rulings of the court it does not follow that we must agree with them.” Alexander
Meiklejohn, Political Freedom: The Constitutional Powers of the People (Westport: Greenwood
Press, 1979) 32-33.
14 All of the Justices who participated in the Buckley decision, with the exception of Chief Justice
Rehnquist, are no longer on the Court.
15 As Meiklejohn stated, “It is not even required that the meaning of the Constitution shall be in the
future w'hat it has been in the past. We are free to change that meaning both by interpretation and by
explicit amendment.” Alexander Meiklejohn, Political Freedom: The Constitutional Powers of the
People (Westport: Greemvood Press, 1979) 7.
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Amendment has thwarted pro-reformists since Buckley and arguably served as the

primary defense of anti-reformists,16 it is only by the means of a full, fair and
adequate examination of the First Amendment that all participants in the reform

debate will be enabled to press forward without continually being bogged down in the
endless cycle of reform and invalidation.
Thesis Plan

The plan of this thesis is as follows. Chapter Two examines some of the basic

approaches to constitutional definition, the historical and philosophical underpinnings
of the First Amendment, and offers six Models of Speech placed on a Spectrum of
Campaign Finance Reform Thought to serve as an analytical framework for
examining what speech is protected by the First Amendment. To put the campaign

finance reform debate in context, Chapter Three briefly examines The Federal

Elections Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA) and Buckley.

The core of this thesis is

contained in Chapter Four within the analysis of reform measures in a first
amendment context, which includes discussion of some of the pro-reformist and anti

reformist positions at issue in light of Buckley. Finally, Chapter Five summarizes this
study and offers some suggestions for future analysis.
My research has revealed that the literature in the first amendment arena is
extensive. However, this literature has not been adequately utilized in the majority of

the current scholarship on campaign finance reform and the issues created by
Buckley.

Two primary research approaches are normally utilized to determine

16 My review of the literature finds only a limited number of scholars citing empirical studies that
indicate reform is not needed. See, e.g., Bradley A. Smith, “Faulty Assumptions and Undemocratic
Consequences of Campaign Finance Reform,” The Yale Law Journal 105 (1996) : 1049-1091. It
appears the vast majority of empirical analysis supports a need for reform.
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constitutional meaning. The first approach employs an historical survey method that
seeks to define first amendment meaning by determining the original intent of the
nation’s founders. This makes use of a method of analysis that draws from material

relating to the politics, history and economics of both the current and founding period
of the American nation.

It is usually contained within the literature produced by

political scientists, historians and economists.
Alternatively, a voluminous body of literature employing a legalistic method

has been created to examine the precise legal development of Supreme Court

jurisprudence in the area of campaign finance reform.

This literature charts the

history and distinctions of case law development and statutory enactment and is
usually contained in sources emanating from law schools such as law review articles

and legal treatises.

This thesis will draw from both of these bodies of scholarly work in an effort
to synthesize them to achieve its primary purpose of providing a viable analytical
structure which incorporates first amendment theory as a foundation, and which

cogently examines both pro-reformist and anti-reformist positions. In essence, this
examination is taking a step back in the campaign finance reform debate by analyzing
the issue of constitutional validity at the outset instead of as an afterthought, in an
effort to shed light on and help forge ahead from this seemingly insurmountable

obstacle to far-ranging campaign finance reform—Buckley.

9

Chapter 2

The Search^ for a-First Amendment Free Speech Methodology
“We believe you have made a tragic mistake in this matter in creating a false ‘free
speech’ issue, when the real issue is ...”
-Erastus Coming II, then Mayor of Albany, New York.1

One would likely have great difficulty finding someone to disagree with the

premise that the concept of free speech, as embodied in the First Amendment, is one
of the most valuable jewels in the crown of American political ideology.

For

example, while examining first amendment challenges in 1948, Professor Alexander
•
2
Meiklejohn
referred to the First Amendment as “that provision of the Constitution

which is rightly regarded as its most vital assertion, its most significant contribution
to political wisdom.”3

However, also set in the crown of American political ideology is a jewel of
arguably equivalent value, one that is embodied in the concept of democratic

elections.

This concept encompasses the idea of equality, fairness and meaningful

participation in an elections mechanism in order to determine who shall chart the

journey of the ship of state. As observed by Meiklejohn, “...[W]e Americans are
politically free only insofar as our voting is free.”4 Long before the current campaign

1 Although this quote occurred in the distant past and was made while discussing free speech in a racial
discrimination context, it describes with remarkable precision the pro-reformist position and succinctly
states the core of pro-reformist objection to the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence that has invalidated
reform measures on constitutional grounds. Quoted in Nat Hentoff, Free Speech for Me—But Not for
Thee: How the American Left and Right Relentlessly Censor Each Other (New York: Harper Collins
Publishers, 1992) 65.
2 Twenty' years ago, Franklyn S. Haiman referred to Professor Meiklejohn as “[America’s] most
recognized modem philosopher of the [F]irst [A]mendment.” Franklyn S. Haiman, Speech and Law in
a Free Society (Chicago: The U of Chicago P, 1981) 17.
3 Alexander Meiklejohn, Political Freedom: The Constitutional Powers of the People (Westport:
Greenwood Press, 1979) 3.
4 Meiklejohn, Political Freedom 116.
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finance reform debate, Meiklejohn recognized that the American elections process
might fall short of fulfilling the ideals commonly thought to be embodied in the

concepts of freedom and a fair democratic process, as evidenced by his observation:
The electoral machinery which, by custom and legislative action, we
have imposed upon the Constitution, has been peculiarly unsuccessful
in winning our confidence that it is suited to its purpose. The party
system, as we use or abuse it, with its conventions and platforms, its
campaigning appeals so commonly directed to the self-seeking
interests of individuals and groups, does not give the impression that
we are a nation of free, self governing minds thinking loyally and
objectively about the common good. On the contrary, it makes of us
rather that scrambling collection of ‘factions’ which Jefferson feared
and condemned. The term politics which if we are free men, should
connote our highest aspirations, our most serious and carefully
cultivated thinking, has become a term of reproach and contempt. It
speaks of trickery rather than of intelligence.5
Although Meiklejohn’s observations were made fifty odd years ago, they could easily

have been taken from a positional statement by a present day pro-reformist. Perhaps
even more incredible is the fact that Meiklejohn’s observation recites a vaticination

given more than two hundred years ago by one of America’s most celebrated
founders, Thomas Jefferson. It appears as if the core concerns and issues debated

with such vehemence by pro-reformists and anti-reformists in the campaign finance
reform debate are really not new at all. As a result, campaign finance reform may

very well involve, as one anti-reform scholar describes it, “intractable dilemmas.”6
Interestingly, and perhaps unfortunately, the seemingly intractable dilemmas

of the campaign finance reform debate brought about by the Supreme Court’s

5 Meiklejohn, Political Freedom 160.
6 Lillian R. BeVier, “Campaign Finance Reform: Specious Arguments, Intractable Dilemmas,’’
Columbia Law Review 94 (1994): 1258 - 1280.
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decision in Buckley have thrust the two crown jewels of American political
ideology—free speech and democratic elections—into a maelstrom of scholarly and

public contention highlighting what appears to be an unavoidable and irreconcilable

conflict between the two. Is it possible to have both democratic elections and free

speech? Are these two concepts, as they exist in relation to the modem day funding
of political campaigns, capable of simultaneous existence in American society?

If

not, the assertion of Congressman Richard Gephardt7 must be correct—an assertion
frequently quoted by anti-reformists because, at first blush, it seems so absurd. The

response that naturally springs forth to the American mind is the question: how can

America have a healthy democracy and democratic campaigns without free speech?
However, this absurdity seems to exist because the two jewels of American political

ideology have been both accepted and internalized by most American citizens as

axioms, and any tension between the two necessarily threatens the very edifice of
citizens’ core beliefs about the American system of government.

g

But is this a tension that may be harmonized?9 Perhaps there is another way
to frame the issues in the campaign finance debate that does not pit ideological jewel

against ideological jewel in an either/or sense, but instead allows for some type of

reconciliation between the two. As recognized by one first amendment scholar:

7 “What we have is two important values in direct conflict: freedom of speech and our desire for
healthy campaigns in a healthy democracy. You can’t have both.” Quoted in Nancy Gibbs. “The
Wake-Up Call,” Time, February 3, 1997 : 25.
8 For example, see David Kairys. ed. Freedom of Speech: The Politics of Law, A Progressive
Critique. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1982) 163, who concludes “an ideology of free speech has
become a basic element of [American] national identity.”
9 As one scholar stated, “Democracy, as we know it in America is a condition of tension assumed
allowed and even encouraged within constitutional controls, tension is its bloom, its virtue, its vigor
and its propriety.” Comelia G. Le Boutillier, American Democracy and Natural Law (New York:
Columbia UP, 1950) 16.
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...[T]hough we have a theoretical commitment—stemming from our
history, traditions, temperament, and geography—to freedom of
expression as a near absolute, reality forces us to recognize many
competing rights and interests that tempt us, sometimes with good
reason, in the direction of restraints on our systems of interpersonal
and public communication. 10

It is this inherent tension, as it exists in first amendment theory, between freedom of
expression as a near absolute and a good reasoned temptation to restrain

communication, that shall serve as the parameters of the constitutional aspect of the

campaign finance reform debate examined by this thesis. As discussed, this inherent
tension certainly did not originate within the confines of the campaign finance reform

debate. However, the unique applicability it has to the topic is eerily prescient, as
evidenced by the fact that first amendment theory developed in other contexts has

such an exacting and transferable application to the central issues in the campaign

finance reform debate—no new theories need to be developed or discovered. The

quotations set forth throughout this thesis commenting on first amendment theory in
these separate and distinct areas are meant to demonstrate the validity of this

assertion. The thing often missing in the campaign finance reform debate is perhaps
its most important aspect—the recognition that well-developed and traditional
theories of constitutional interpretation, although often unarticulated, are really at the

core of the reform debate.
The inherent tension identified above between freedom of expression as a
near absolute and a good reasoned temptation to restrain communication, shall serve

as the foundational underpinning of the method employed by this thesis to analyze the

10 Haiman 4.

r
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First Amendment and campaign finance reform. Of course, the empirical legitimacy
of the first concept of the inherent tension—the existence of an American theoretical

commitment to freedom of expression as a near absolute—may be vulnerable to
challenge.11

However, this thesis accepts this concept as an axiom and leaves an

exploration of the legitimacy of this belief for a later time. Freedom of expression as
a near absolute shall serve as both the guidepost and conceptual basis for the extreme

of anti-reformist thought. Similarly, the second concept of this inherent tension in

first

amendment

theory—a

good

reasoned

temptation

to

restrain

communication—shall serve as the extreme of pro-reformist thought.
By utilizing these two concepts as the embodiment of the inherent tension

present in the First Amendment and by conceptualizing each as a polar extreme of the

other,12 a Spectrum of Campaign Finance Reform Thought 13 can be visualized. Then,
the various positions held by those participating in the campaign finance reform

debate may be evaluated in first amendment terms and placed at some point along

that spectrum. To aid in this placement, this thesis utilizes a classification mechanism
that evaluates particular paradigms for first amendment definition by placing them

into Models of Speech. The spectrum of reform thought and the model of speech

11 For example, in examining die early American commitment to freedom of speech, Leonard W. Levy
points out: “The evidence provides little comfort for the notion that the colonies hospitably received
advocates of obnoxious or detestable ideas on matters that counted. Nor is there reason to believe that
rambunctious unorthodoxies suffered only from Puritan bigots and tyrannous royal judges. The
American people simply did not understand that freedom of thought and expression means equal
freedom for die other fellow, especially the one with hated ideas.” Leonard W. Levy, Freedom of
Speech and Press in Early American History (Cambridge: Harvard UP, Belknap Press 1960) 35. This
thread of diought has continued viability in modem day American society.
12 The diesis is built around the premises that the two concepts are at odds, and as ultimates, are
contraries.
13 See Appendix A for a graphical representation of die Spectrum of Campaign Finance Reform
Thought.
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classification mechanism are used as the organizing framework to provide a coherent

method of analysis and to function as a useful analytical structure to evaluate the
constitutional validity of pro-reformist and anti-reformist positions.

If this

methodology does nothing else, perhaps at the least, it will enable those involved in
the campaign finance reform debate to better focus on their own positions and the

positions of others, and to develop a greater understanding of the theoretical
underpinnings of pro-reform and anti-reform positions. By developing a mechanism
to determine how each viewpoint relates to the actual essence of the campaign

finance reform debate, the apparent conflict between the simultaneous existence of

democratic elections and free speech that Buckley brought to the forefront may be, if

not resolved, at least better understood.14
Approaches to Constitutional Definition
Before identifying the six Models of Speech, it is necessary to examine the

various approaches that have been developed to arrive at the correct meaning of
constitutional provisions.

In order to analyze the constitutional legitimacy of

campaign finance reform in light of the First Amendment, it must first be decided
how the meaning of the First Amendment is to be discovered: what process, method

or approach should be used to arrive at a definition to ensure we are proceeding to the

correct and true meaning of the First Amendment?

14 “Wisdom consists more in clarifying the fundamental problems and alternatives than in providing
solutions.” Harry V. Jaffa, attributing this belief to Leo Strauss, in Original Intent and the Framers of
the Constitution: A Disputed Question (Washington, D.C.: Regnery Publishing, 1994) 171. Perhaps,
at the least, this thesis can assist in the journey toward discovering some sort of “wisdom” in the
campaign finance reform debate.

15
As one constitutional scholar has described, “[t]he deepest political
differences in American history have always been concerning the meaning of the

Constitution, whether as originally intended, or as amended” (emphasis added).15

Campaign finance reform certainly evidences a deep political difference in American
history through both the importance of its issues to the functioning of the American
elections mechanism, and simply by virtue of its longevity in the American political
landscape. It has managed to command a conspicuous place in the American political

debate for at least three decades.
Unfortunately, agreeing on a method for determining constitutional meaning
is as intractable a dilemma as determining the efficacy of specific reform measures.16

It is precisely because of this seemingly insurmountable initial obstacle that the issue
of campaign finance reform is still being debated. The United States Congress has

spoken by enacting the 1971 Federal Elections Campaign Act (FECA),

17

but the

United States Supreme Court has also spoken by way of Buckley, and the speech of

each branch of government directly clashes with the other. As a result, unless the
position of one of these bodies changes, this conflict will continue without resolution.

In analyzing the threshold issue of constitutional meaning, it becomes
apparent that there are some rather well-defined intellectual traditions developed as

potential methods for determining constitutional meaning.

Although the list is not

15 Jaffa 15.
16 Tliis was artfully stated by Professor Laurence H. Tribe in the preface to the second edition of his
book on constitutional law, in which he discussed his continuing education on matters constitutional
and commented that he was “...gaining in the process a deeper appreciation of the very great
difference between reading the Constitution we have and writing the Constitution some of us might
wish to have.” Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law (Mineola: The Foundation Press,
Inc., 1988) iii.
17 See discussion of FECA in Chapter 3.
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finite and the approaches claiming legitimacy continually compete for recognition as

being the proper method, the most common approaches include: legal positivism,

natural law and utilitarianism.
It is important to note that two possible approaches to constitutional definition
that are not included within this list and that are often included in the literature as
approaches for constitutional definition are methods making use of original intent and

contractarian approaches.

As discussed in the introduction to this thesis, original

intent seeks to define constitutional meaning by reference to the intention, desires or
purposes of the nation’s founders. It seeks to apply the provisions of the Constitution

as originally intended without change.
In a similar vein, contractarian approaches arrive at constitutional definition

by appealing to an historical era. One wellspring of contractarianism is John Locke’s

Two Treatises of Government,

published in 1690, in which Locke theorized that

government comes about for the purpose of preserving individual private property. In
order to effectuate this goal, those that form the government agree to divest

themselves of some of their natural liberty. This divestiture is an original compact, or
contract, and it is by virtue of this compact that individuals bind themselves to the
will of the majority even if that will diverges from their own.
Inherent in both the original intent and contractarian approaches, there exists a

belief that the Constitution is frozen as of one place and time and as such, being
already completely formed, its definition and meanings are already affixed and

certain, and change is not to be found through interpretation but only through

18 Locke, John, Two Treatises of Government, ed. Peter Laslett (London: Cambridge UP. 1970).
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amendment.

This thesis does not treat either approach as a true constitutional

definitional approach because each is more- of a justification mechanism that is

employed to demonstrate the validity of a positivist, natural law or utilitarian
approach. As a result, only the natural law, positivist and utilitarian approaches have

been used as categories in this examination.

However, when applicable the

influences of original intent and contractariansim will be identified and discussed.

Another sub-issue that arises in the context of determining constitutional
meaning has endured from the time of the formation of the American nation. This

issue is concerned with whether the Supreme Court is simply another policy maker,
like the executive and judicial branches, with its own agenda of interests and

preferences that it attempts to effectuate through judicial pronouncements, or whether

its style of decision making is separate and distinct from a political model. There are

those that argue that jurisprudence follows political ideology or is a byproduct of
one’s general world view and takes the form that it does not because of its internal
coherence or the sophistication of its logical structure, but for fairly conventional
political reasons.

However, even if one accepts this pessimistic view of judicial

behavior, the intellectual traditions that will be discussed below inevitably play some

part in the determination of constitutional meaning—either as ad hoc rationalizations
of specific decision making or as coherent bodies of belief consistently adhered to but
manipulated to support policy choices.

Legal Positivism Tradition
The legal positivism intellectual tradition, also know as legal realism, has
sought to provide meaning to constitutional provisions by accepting the decisions of a

18

nation’s highest legislators or courts as to the meaning and application of

constitutional provisions.19 The heirs of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes and Charles

Evans Hughes have been described asadhereftts-of legal positivism. Reflective of
I
this tradition is the following statement, made by Charles Evans Hughes, in a 1907

speech: “We are under a Constitution, but the Constitution is what the judges say it
is.”20

One scholar traces the modern origins of legal positivism to Thomas Hobbes

and his 1651 publication of Leviathan™ and traced the ancient roots of legal
positivism to Plato’s Republic?2 as evidenced by the argument Thrasymachus
advanced: the definition ofjustice could be found in the “interest of the stronger.”23

How might a constitutional commentator proceeding from a positivist point of
view be recognized? Consider the statement made by one highly regarded scholar in
the area of constitutional law in addressing how best to arrive at constitutional

meaning:

“Ultimately,

this treatise is premised on the axiom that the

Constitution—what it says, although not necessarily what some of its authors or

ratifiers intended or assumed—is binding law” (emphasis added).

24

Here, the positivistic approach is readily apparent. It is what the Constitution

says, not what its writers and ratifiers intended, that must be examined to give the
Constitution meaning. However, the author also leaves some room to proceed from
19 Lewis E. Lehrman, Foreword. Original Intent and the Framers of the Constitution: A Disputed
Question, by Harry V. Jaffa. (Washington, D.C.: Regnery Publishing, 1994) 3.
20 Jaffa 159, n. 24, quoting speech of Charles Evans Hughes given at Elmira, New York on May 3,
1907.
21 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (New York: Dutton, 1950).
22 Plato, Republic, ed. James Adam (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1963).
23 Jaffa 159, n. 23.
24 Tribe 10, n. 2.
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other approaches when he includes not necessarily as a qualifier indicating some
willingness to consider an original- intent approach in determining meaning.

He

further hedges when he states:

• ..[T]his treatise...[does not accept]...the perspective of those
theorists who deem constitutional text in particular, or language in
general, to be so radically indeterminate that any text is capable of
meaning virtually anything one wants it to mean.25

This quote makes clear that positivists clearly do put some limits on determining

meaning by alluding to the fact that the spectrum of positivism encompasses varying
degrees of interpretation in determining what meaning to provide to the constitutional

language used. But it is the text itself that must be adhered to in defining meaning as

opposed to the policy, history or influences present in the era of authorship.
Natural Law Tradition
A second intellectual tradition of constitutional interpretation is the natural

law approach. One scholar describes the natural law tradition as “an ancient doctrine

positing a natural law,” apparently a metaphysical principle that regards “the essential

nature of man” as “[a] sufficient source and criterion of human rights and of
justice.”26 Another scholar provides the following definition:

The term natural law is defined as that self-evident law which, being
grounded in an abstract-universal “nature” of things, including man
and society, remains essentially—that is to say as to its very
foundation and justification—independent of convention or tradition;
of legislation or legal action; and of historically developed social
institutions or ideologies—a law therefore, the very foundation of
which is in reason or “nature,” and which is valid for all times or all
places. 27
25 Tribe 13, n. 9.
26 Le Boutillier v.
27 Anton-Hermann Chroust, “The Nature of Natural Law,” in Interpretations of Modern Legal
Philosophies, ed. Paul Sayre (New York: Oxford UP, 1947) 70.
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The natural law concept is aptly described as ancient in that it can be traced
back for more than twenty centuries.28 The natural law tradition embraces the belief

that there is a fundamental law upon- which the American nation- was- founded,

evidenced by founding documents of the American Nation—the Declaration of
Independence and the English precursors of that document such as the Magna Charta.

Proponents of the natural law tradition in America often point to the language of the
Declaration of Independence:

“the laws of nature and of nature’s God that these

truths to be self evident that all men are created equal and they are endowed by their
creator with the unalienable rights-to life-, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.”
Under this view, it is apparent that nature, or the creator, is the origin and source of
all political rights.

Professor Finnis provides a definition of natural law by positing three
assertions:

There are (i) a set of basic practical-principles which indicate the basic
forms of human flourishing as goods to be pursued and realized, and
which are in one way or another used by everyone who considers what
to do, however unsound his conclusions; and (ii) a set of basic
methodological requirements of practical reasonableness (itself one of
the basic forms of human flourishing) which distinguish sound from
unsound practical thinking and which, when all brought to bear,
provide the criteria for distinguishing between acts that (always or in
particular circumstances) are reasonable-all-things-considered (and not
merely relative-to-a-particular purpose) and acts that are unreasonableall-things-considered, i.e. between ways of acting that are morally
right or morally wrong—thus enabling one to formulate (iii) a set of
general moral standards.29
As the above quote demonstrates, the themes of natural law posit an objective truth

and a universal rightness that is right and proper in all places and all circumstances.
28 Chroust 57.
29 John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980) 23.
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The basic practical principles, practical reasonableness and general moral standards
form the basis of the Constitution under the natural law approach, and the
interpretation of its provisions may only be done in light of the influence they had

upon the document’s creation. In the view of one scholar, a notable judicial example

of a subscriber to the natural law constitutional approach was Chief Justice John
Marshall, to whom he attributes a jurisprudence that extends to a natural constitution
existing behind the written Constitution.30

Utilitarian Tradition

The utilitarian tradition may be simply stated as a concern for the greatest

good for the greatest number of people in society. It attempts to maximize good in an
effort to maximize happiness. Its roots may be traced back to Jeremy Bentham, but

its primary importance to approaches to constitutional definition in this examination
of the concept of freedom of expression in the First Amendment has its origins in the

writings of John Stuart Mill.

One of Mill’s major contributions to utilitarianism came in his publication of
On Liberty,31 in which he advocated the importance of free and robust public debate
to ensure the health of society. Mill argued that three situations are possible: (1) if

heretical opinion contains the truth, and if we silence it, we lose the chance of
exchanging truth for error; (2) if received and contesting opinions each hold part of

the truth, their clash in open discussion provides the best means to discover the truth
in each; (3) even if the heretical view is wholly false and the orthodoxy contains the

whole truth, the received truth, unless debated and challenged, will be held in the
30 Jaffe 159, n. 23.
31 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, ed. David Spitz (New York: Norton, 1975).
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manner of prejudice or dead dogma, its meaning may be forgotten or enfeebled, and it

will be inefficacious for good.32

Mill focused primarily on the importance of having

a “free press' as a mechanism to protect against tyrannical or corrupt government.

To shed further light on what is meant by a utilitarian viewpoint to
constitutional definition, consider the following statement:
... [T]he real meaning of judicial review is to be found in the
introduction of mediating principles between the large constitutional or
philosophical concepts to which some or all of a community pay
tribute and the common problems of reconciliation which beset the
modem state.33
This statement appears to be, at least in part, utilitarian in that it relies on the process

of judicial review to reconcile philosophical concepts and common problems by

utilizing mediating principles. Judicial review (or providing constitutional definition)

seeks only to achieve the good, not merely to adhere to some philosophical concepts
in an absolute sense (such as those inspired by natural law) or to adhere to common

problems of reconciliation (such as choosing solely to look at the laws passed by

legislature in a positivist approach).
Another explanation of a utilitarian type approach is evidenced by the method
of determining constitutional definition advocated by Judge J. Skelly Wright.34 Judge

Wright defended the Warren Court era during which values appeared to take
precedence over principles.

As one critique of Judge Wright describes: “[Judge

Wright argues]...that a Court engaged in choosing fundamental values for society

32 C. Edwin Baker, “Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech,” UCLA Law Review 25
(1978) : 964-965.
33 Tribe 14, quoting Freund, “Umpiring the Federal System,” 54 Columbia Law Rexdew 561 (1954).
34 J. Skelly Wright, “Professor Bickel, The Scholarly Tradition, and the Supreme Court,” 84 Harvard
Law Review 769 (1971).
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cannot be expected to produce principled decisions at the same time. Decisions first,
principles later.... [It is]...value choice that is the most important function of the
Supreme Court.”35 This process of choosing values, or choosing between conflicting

values, is utilitarian in nature. It entails defining the Constitution based upon value
choices that are beneficial and useful to society. It involves a court in “making rather

than implement[ing] value choices.”36 As will be demonstrated in Chapter Four, this
approach is problematic because, if as is the case in the American nation, a court is a

coequal branch of government with the final say on constitutional interpretation, an
irresolvable conflict may arise if that court chooses a different value than that chosen
by one or more of its coequal branches.

The First Amendment
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress
grievances.’ 37

or
of
to
of

In a search for the meaning of the First Amendment, it is helpful to briefly
examine the political and social history that gave rise to the philosophical

assumptions underlying the concept of freedom of expression as it is embodied in the

First Amendment. There are many historical threads one might choose to follow to
assist in the identification of the meaning of the First Amendment, but the most

recognizable roots may be traced to the sixteenth century. It was during this era that

35 Robert H. Bork, “Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems,” Indiana Law Journal 47
(1971) : 5.
36 Bork 6.
37 U.S. Constitution, Amendment I (1791).
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medieval theology and its control over human thought, directing it to concerns of
after-life issues, were replaced by thoughts of this life.38 A new focus on the analysis
of experience by reason and experimentation developed, a belief in the right to think

freely began to emerge, and this gave impetus to the rise of Liberalism.39 Alongside

this new focus was the growth of the middle class that built upon commercial
interests and that soon shook the bonds of sixteenth century church and state. 40

Against this sixteenth century backdrop a new idea was produced by John
Milton’s publication of the Areopagitica that is described by one author as

majestic argument for intellectual freedom in the libertarian tradition. „41

“a

The

Areopagitica was Milton’s response to an attempt to prosecute him for issuing

unlicensed pamphlets of divorce.42 Milton argued against the practice of censorship
and advocated liberty of expression as evidenced by his statement that “when
complaints are freely heard, deeply considered, and speedily reformed, then is the
utmost bound of civil liberty attained that wise men look for.”43 Of particular interest

to the campaign finance reform debate is Milton’s criticism of censorship that he

believed to be dangerous and arbitrary resulting in limitations on diversity and the
discernment of truth. Consider the following quote:
And though all the wind of doctrine were let loose to play upon the earth, so
Truth be in the field, we do injuriously by licensing and prohibiting to
misdoubt her strength. Let her and Falsehood grapple; who ever knew Truth
38 Harold J. Laski, The Rise ofLiberalism (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1936) 74 - 75.
39 Laski 74 - 75.
40 Laski 98 -99.
41 Fredrick Siebert, Theodore Peterson, and Wilbur Schramm, Four Theories of the Press, 12th ed.
(Urbana: U of Illinois P, 1979) 42.
42 Fredrick Siebert, Freedom of the Press in England 1476-1776 (Urbana: The U of Illinois P, 1952)
195.
43 John Milton, Areopagitica and OfEducation, ed. George H. Sabine (New York: Appleton-CenturyCrofts, 1951)2.
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put to the worse in a free and open encounter. Her confuting is the best and
surest suppressing.44
Milton was certain that truth would eventually triumph over falsehood in a free and
open encounter and free access to the ideas and thoughts of others would result in the
discovery of truth.

Milton’s sixteenth century ideas were at work in eighteenth

century America and greatly influenced the authors of the Constitution and the First

Amendment.
Beyond the historical influences of the First Amendment, as discussed above,

another focal point of contention about the First Amendment in the campaign finance
reform debate centers upon a basic disagreement as to whether the First Amendment

is a positive grant of power to government permitting it to ensure a well-functioning
deliberative process among political equals, or is a negative restraint that views

government regulation of speech as the “antithesis of freedom.”45 Once again, this
disagreement is an omnipresent sub-issue in the campaign finance reform debate that

forms an almost insurmountable obstacle on the road to resolution.

Essentially, it is a basic disagreement about the proper interpretation of the
First Amendment and the proper role of government in the American political
scheme.

The issue is:

does the First Amendment limit, or does it permit, active

governmental participation in creating a particular national environment? Or, to put

the issue somewhat differently, is the First Amendment to be properly understood as a
positive restraint on governmental action or as an affirmative grant of power to take

action?

44 Milton 50.
45 Lillian R. BeVier, “Campaign Finance Reform” 1260.
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The position of the Buckley majority left no doubt of the United States
Supreme Court’s view when it stated:

The concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements
of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly
foreign to the First Amendment, which was designed ‘to secure the
widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and
•
•
antagonistic
sources. -»46
Agreeing with the United States Supreme Court, one anti-reform scholar writes:

The First Amendment’s negative constraints on government, which
embody our traditional conception of ‘freedom of speech,’ have been
instrumental in the achievement of the broadly participatory, relatively
open, officially uncensored, political debate in which we take pride. It
is a mistake, however, to maintain that because the debate that
emerges under the First Amendment is quite robust, the First
Amendment is intended to assure the widest possible debate about
matters of concern to the community or that its guarantee of autonomy
may be sacrificed in order to ensure a well-functioning deliberative
process among political equals. Such a conclusion mistakes the effect
of the principle for the principle itself.47
A comprehensive investigation of the scope of the First Amendment, while it

undoubtedly would be helpful, is outside of the scope of this thesis.

Instead, this

section on the First Amendment is included only to give a flavor of some of the

historical influences upon it by briefly identifying some of its historical roots.
However, one important aspect of this section for the campaign finance reform debate

is the idea introduced immediately above:

that of whether to view the First

Amendment as a positive grant of power to government or a negative restraint upon
it—for as will be discussed below, this seems to be the core of Buckley.

46 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976) (quoting New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266
(1964); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945)).
47 BeVier, “Campaign Finance Reform” 1258.
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Models of Speech
Having given the general theoretical background of the major intellectual

traditions of constitutional interpretation and some of the historical underpinnings of

the First Amendment, it is now possible to proceed to the central theme of this thesis
and identify the classification mechanisms that will be superimposed upon the
Spectrum of Campaign Finance Reform Thought identified above. The rubric of this

classification mechanism is Models of Speech and it is through these models that the
contested reform proposals stricken by Buckley, as well as those that survived and

those that have yet to be devised, may be cogently analyzed and evaluated.

An

analysis must go beyond the glittering generalities so often advanced by both pro
reformists and anti-reformists about the propriety of their positions and discern the
true theoretical basis for their positions.

Only then do pro-reformist and anti

reformist positions become amenable to analysis for consistency and viability in a

constitutional sense. Although these paradigmatic models are certainly not the only
possible method for analyzing first amendment issues in a campaign finance reform
context, they are a useful organizational structure for encouraging thoughtful analysis.

Model 1 —The Equalizing Model

The theoretical foundations of the Equalizing Model lie in the “basic tension
between a private market economy and a modem democratic polity.”48

The

Equalizing Model attempts to create and maintain “a well functioning political

48 Jamin Raskin and John Bonifaz, “The Constitutional Imperative and Practical Superiority of
Democratically Financed Elections,” 94 Columbia Law Review 1160 (1994): 1161-1162, n. 8.
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process among political equals.”49

It views the First Amendment as permitting -

government to engage in affirmative action- to- ensure that social- and economic

inequalities do not translate into political inequalities.50 This Model proceeds from a
theoretical basis that views the First-Amendment as a positive grant of-power to

government, permitting it to take active steps to redistribute political resources in an
effort to enhance the political process. Additionally, the Equalizing Model embraces

use of the term speech in the First Amendment to extend to a system of expression.

This system of expression will be discussed at length in Model 6, the Full Protection
Model, and to prevent redundancy it will not be examined here. It is sufficient to note

at this point, that the Equalizing Model and the Full Protection Model share the same

broad definition of First Amendment speech. However, the Equalizing Model gives

government broad, far-ranging powers to actively implement this definition.
Model 2 — The Marketplace of Ideas Model

The Marketplace of Ideas Model incorporates the belief that “truth can be

discovered

only

through robust

debate [that]

is free from governmental

interference.”51 The focus of this Model is on the societal benefits of free speech and

it forms a theoretical basis primarily from a utilitarian point of view. This can be seen
by comparing its approach to John Stuart Mill’s emphasis on the importance of free
debate to ensure that the beliefs and opinions held by a society remain viable and not

simply “dead dogma...inefficacious for [the public] good.”

52

49 Cass R. Sunstein, “Free Speech Now,” The Bill ofRights in the Modern State, ed. Geoffrey R. Stone,
et al. (Chicago: Chicago UP. 1992) 292.
50 Sunstein, The Partial Constitution, (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1993) 84.
51 C. Edwin Baker 964.
52 Baker 965, quoting J. S. Mill, On Liberty (1956).
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Professor C. Edwin Baker breaks the Marketplace of Ideas Model into two
sub-categories and labels these categories as “classical” and “market failure.”53 In the

Classical Marketplace of Ideas, a typical- Millsian- approach is evident-as-it is-only

through the competition of ideas that it is possible to discover truth. Baker identifies
three crucial assumptions of the Classical Marketplace of Ideas Model. First, drawing

from the natural law tradition of constitutional interpretation, the classical variant of

the model presupposes the existence of an objective or discoverable truth—there must
be a truth to be discovered.
Second, this model requires “people to possess the capacity to perceive truth

or reality” and their “social location must not control the manner in which they
perceive or understand the world. „54

Socialized perceptions based only upon

arbitrary circumstances and power relations among groups would interfere with
people’s ability to perceive truth, and those perceptions would radically vary
depending upon the experiences of the groups to which each individual belongs.
Finally, people must be able to sort through the form and frequency of messages to

evaluate the core notions contained therein—otherwise only those perspectives that

are best packaged, advertised and promoted will gain acceptance.55
These three assumptions are easily summarized: the classical variant of the

Marketplace of Ideas Model requires the existence of an objective truth that is
capable of being perceived by the members of society, and those members must be

able to sort through messages to recognize the core notions contained within them

53 Baker 964.
54 Baker 967.
55 Baker 967.

30

The second variant of the Marketplace of Ideas Model which Baker identifies
is the Market Failure Model.56 It is concerned with what it perceives as an “absence

of meaningful access opportunities for certain positions and advocates that these
views be guaranteed adequate access to the marketplace.”57 Baker recognizes the

difficulty with this approach when he writes: “of course, the practical problem with
this position as a constitutional standard rather than as a legislative policy is the

difficulty

of

determining

what

amounts

meaningful...[access]...opportunity” (emphasis added).

to
58

an

adequate

or

The core component of the

Market Failure Model is the belief that people do not have equal opportunity to

participate in the marketplace of ideas and this failure of opportunities for

participation violates the equality standard that is so important to American
democracy.
Model 3 — The Literal Model

The most basic model used to define protected First Amendment speech is

embodied in the Literal Model. This Model’s approach is extremely simplistic and
does not attract many scholarly proponents arguing from a pure Literal Model

theoretical basis. However, the Literal Model is helpful for two reasons: first, it is in
fact an approach taken by some commentators, scholars and jurists; and second, but

perhaps more important, it provides the basic origins of our modem day disputes
about constitutional meaning.

56 Baker 981.
57 Baker 982.
58 Baker 982.
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The Literal Model focuses exclusively on a literal or absolute theoretical
underpinning to determine what the First Amendment means by the term “speech.”59

In doing so, it simply legally dismisses specific instances of speech by an appeal to

positive law. The heavy influence of a positivistic approach, as defined earlier in this

chapter, is readily discernable.
The Literal Model asserts that verbal speech, as opposed to non-verbal

conduct, is the only thing protected by the First Amendment. Speech is defined by
determining what range of phenomena is properly encompassed under the First
Amendment’s concept of free speech.

The range of phenomena includes words

because “[c]learly it has been the predominant assumption of our legal system that,
unless there is good cause to treat them otherwise, words are the very thing

safeguarded by the First Amendment....” 60 As a result, words rather than conduct
are what is protected by the First Amendment.

Further, words are protected

“whether...spoken, sung, broadcast, or printed on a sign, button, handbill, newspaper,

magazine, or even the back of a jacket.”61

Simply put, words are what the First

Amendment protects and words are protected speech regardless of how they are
conveyed, while conduct is, if speech at all, unprotected speech.

This literal definition of speech is then used to analyze specific circumstances
of speech on an ad hoc basis in an effort to determine if they are amenable to
governmental regulation or protected by the First Amendment. The Literal Model is

largely ignored in modem day Supreme Court Jurisprudence, but it did form the basis
59 See Thomas Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment (New York: Random
House, 1966) vii.
60 Haiman 16.
61 Haiman 16.
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of early Supreme Court Jurisprudence when the first parameters of the First
Amendment began to be defined in Supreme Court decisions following World War
j 62

However, there have been judges on the Supreme Court that have relied on just

this type of literal interpretation in defining the parameters of First Amendment

speech.
For example, in the 1971 landmark decision of Cohen v. California, 63 Justices
Blackmun, Black and Burger wrote a dissenting opinion that argued for upholding the

conviction of a defendant who appeared in a county courthouse wearing a jacket
emblazoned with a written expletive about America’s military draft.

The opinion

basically argued that the defendant’s actions involved mainly conduct and little

speech.64

According to the dissent, the government was regulating conduct as

opposed to speech and this regulation did not violate the protections of the First

Amendment. However, the majority opinion in Cohen did not take a literal stance,
and found that the process of communication is what the First Amendment
protects—not the words themselves.
As a method of defining First Amendment speech that is applicable to specific

facts and circumstances, the viability of the Literal Model is questionable. This is

because the real challenge in First Amendment cases does not lie in distinguishing
between verbal speech and non-verbal conduct.

Instead, it is in distinguishing

between non-verbal speech and non-verbal conduct, especially if one adopts the view
62 See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919);
Gitlow v. New York. 268 U.S. 652 (1925); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
63 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
64 Professor Haiman called this dissenting opinion “terse, offbeat and inexplicable” and described the
Cohen majority opinion as taking “.. .a more expansive view of the communication process—a view, it
is hoped, that will continue to command the support of a majority of the Court. . . .” Haiman 16-17.
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that the First Amendment protects words regardless of the mechanism used to convey

them.

Model 4 — The Political Speech Model
The Political Speech Model is built upon the premise that what is being
protected by the First Amendment’s reference to speech is political speech.

The

focus is on the purpose of the speech. Only speech classified as political speech

receives First Amendment protection. All other speech, while it may receive other
constitutional protection, does not have First Amendment constitutional protection.

This theory classifies speech as falling into separate and distinct categories—political
speech and private speech—with each type receiving protection by virtue of different
constitutional provisions resulting in different degrees of protection. This Model is

based upon a belief that America’s founders were rationalists who sought only to

protect serious and decent discourse about public affairs.65
The modem origin of this theory can be traced back to Professor Meiklejohn

who identified a constitutional distinction between private liberties and public
freedoms. Meiklejohn believed that private liberties received protection via the Fifth

Amendment and public freedoms, such as free speech, received constitutional
protection by virtue of the First Amendment.66 The origins of public freedoms are in
the social compact of society and are based upon the fact that all members of the

American nation inherently possess and are legally entitled to an equal status in
decision making on matters concerning the common good. Meiklejohn describes the

65 Haiman 16-17, discussing the viewpoint of Walter Berns.
66 Meiklejohn, Political Freedom xv.
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scope of the First Amendment as extending to the prohibition of “...the mutilation of
the thinking process of the community.”67

Meiklejohn’s view is grounded in the “necessities of the process of selfgovernment” and leads to, if accepted, “a sharp circumscription of the arena in which
the first amendment protection of free speech operates.”68 The limiting effect of this

sharp circumscription not only reduces the parameters of the arena in which First

Amendment protections operate, but it also simultaneously increases the level of
protection of the speech falling within that arena by conferring on such speech an
almost absolute and unqualified protection.

One must use the qualifier almost

because Meiklejohn does place some limits on the extent of protection afforded

political speech under the First Amendment. Meiklejohn states:
The First Amendment...is not the guardian of unregulated
talkativeness. It does not require that, on every occasion, every citizen
shall take part in public debate.... What is essential is not that
everyone shall speak, but that everything worth saying shall be said.69
Political speech receives protection from the First Amendment guarantee that
the freedom of speech shall not be abridged. Since communication about political

matters has relevance to the process of self-government and since citizens in a
democracy are the governors,

70

only unrestrained freedom of discussion concerning

public affairs will ensure that the wisest political decisions are made.

67 Meiklejohn, Political Freedom 27; 109.
68 Haiman 433, n. 6.
69 Meiklejohn 26.
70 As reflected in the well known statement of President Abraham Lincoln about American
Government, “...government of the people, by the people, and for the people.” President Abraham
Lincoln, Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863), reprinted in D. Fehrenbacher, ed., Abraham Lincoln:
Speeches and Writings (1859-1865) (Stanford: Stanford UP, 1989) 536.
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Private speech encompasses individual expression unrelated to the political

process and as a result it falls outside of the purview of First Amendment protection.
Instead, the source of protection for private speech is the word liberty in the Fifth

Amendment. 71

The speech protection of the Fifth Amendment, unlike First

Amendment speech protection, is highly amenable to governmental regulation both in

nature and scope. The Fifth Amendment protects liberty and liberty-derived speech,
and unlike First Amendment political speech, the government may circumscribe
liberty-derived speech so long as such circumscription takes place according to due

process of law. The Fifth Amendment protections of speech stand in stark contrast to

the First Amendment language: “Congress shall make no law...abridging the freedom
of speech,...” denoting an absolute prohibition of government regulation that
impinges on the freedom of speech.

Many objections have been raised to Meiklejohn’s public-private speech
dichotomy. Professor Chaffee rejected Meiklejohn’s discovery of a special category
of political speech and asserted that you cannot create an arbitrary hierarchy of values

for various categories or types of speech, but that all expression must look to the First
Amendment for whatever protection it may or may not obtain.

72

In a similar vein,

Mieklejohn’s public-private speech dichotomy and the corresponding reliance on
different constitutional provisions to govern the protections to be afforded the
different types of speech is labeled by Professor Haiman as “a figment of his

71 “No person shall...be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S.
Constitution. Amendment V (1791).
72 See Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Free Speech in the United States (Union: Lawbook Exchange, 2000).
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imagination.”

Perhaps Meiklejohn’s response would be that he did not create an

arbitrary hierarchy of values—the United States Constitution did.

Model 5 — The Liberty Model
The Liberty Model is based upon the theory of First Amendment meaning
advanced by Professor C. Edwin Baker.74

Baker extends First Amendment free

speech protection to an arena of individual liberty and speech is protected because of
the value of the speech conduct to the individual15

This protection is justified

because the conduct protected “fosters individual self-realization and selfdetermination” and is enforced as long as the conduct protected does not “improperly
interfere with the legitimate claim of others.”76 Baker describes his approach as the

. .most coherent theory of the [F]irst [A]mendment” and urges its use because of the
“...salutary implications for judicial elaboration of the [F]irst [A]mendment.”77 The

Liberty Model protects First Amendment speech from “certain governmental
restrictions on non-coercive, nonviolent, substantively valued conduct, including

nonverbal conduct.” 78
In the Liberty Model, First Amendment speech is not limited merely to verbal

speech or non-verbal speech. Instead, it encompasses an arena of individual liberty
that is protected, not because of its value to society, but because of its value to the

individual.

73 Haiman 433.
74 See C. Edwin Baker, “Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech,” UCLA Law Review 25
(1978).
75 Baker 966.
76 Baker 966.
77 Baker 964.
78 Baker 966.

I
37

Model 6 — The Full Protection Model
The Full Protection Model is based-upon- the ideas of Professor Thomas

Emerson.79 Emerson asserted that a system of freedom of expression was central to
the function of a democratic society, and in American society that system- rests to a

major extent with the First Amendment.
Emerson groups the values a society should protect in a system of freedom of
expression into four broad categories: (1) as a method of assuring individual self
fulfillment, (2) as a means of attaining truth, (3) as a method of securing participation

by the members of the society in social and political, decision-making, and (4) as a

means of maintaining the balance between stability and change in the society.80
Emerson’s system of expression, like the protection afforded to political

speech by the Political Speech Model, has an absolute quality. However, the realm of

absolute protection is drawn around expression.

While the state may prohibit or

compel “action,” this is to be contrasted with the right of “expression” which
occupies “a specially protected position.”

O |

Emerson identifies thought and

communication as the “fountainhead of all expression of the individual personality,”

and believes that “freedom at the point of this fountainhead is essential to all other

freedoms.
Drawing from Emerson’s system of expression, the Full Protection Model

embraces the idea that law and legal institutions can and should play an affirmative

79 See Thomas I. Emerson, Toward A General Theory of the First Amendment (New York: Random
House, 1966).
80 Emerson 3.
81 Emerson 6.
82 Emerson 7.
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role in the maintenance of a system that protects freedom of expression. This rejects
other viewpoints that see the law and judicial process as only ascribing to legal

institutions some lesser role in the protection of individual rights.

In essence,

Emerson’s system draws an absolute protective boundary around behavior, whether

verbal or nonverbal, calls that expression behavior, and extends to it First
Amendment protection that is absolute in nature.
Chapter Summary

This chapter provides both the substructure and superstructure that enables the
core analysis of campaign finance reform to take place in Chapter Four. To complete

this daunting task, this chapter has identified some of the difficulties and complexities
that are involved in attempting to formulate a First Amendment free speech

methodology. This chapter formulates such a methodology by identifying a Spectrum
of Campaign Finance Reform Thought and six Models of Speech to be used in

evaluating the constitutionality of reform positions and placing those positions upon

the spectrum using the classification mechanisms of the models. This methodology is

employed in the analysis in Chapter Four of some campaign finance reform positions
concerning the proper approach for determining constitutional definition.

This

methodology is employed in Chapter Four by analyzing some campaign finance

reform positions.

However, before engaging in the core analysis, Chapter Three

examines the two factors that make such an analysis necessary—the Federal Elections

Campaign Act and the United States Supreme Court case of Buckley v. Valeo.
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Chapter 3

The Federal Elections Campaign Act of 1971, Buckley, and Beyond

The Federal Elections Campaign Act of 1971
The modern advent of significant campaign finance regulation has its genesis in
the Federal Elections Campaign Act (FECA) of 19711 and the unprecedented regulation

that was undertaken by its enactment.2

The original enactment of FECA had as its

fundamental purpose the containment of ever-increasing federal political campaign costs.
However, in the wake of the Watergate crises, Democratic majorities in Congress were

able to pass amendments to FECA that effectively created a whole new regulatory

structure in 1974.

The true parameters of FECA became clear only after the passage of

the 1974 amendments that are aptly described as substantial.4

Further post-Bwc£Zey

modifications to FECA came in 1976 and 1979? One scholar helpfully described the

scope of FECA and its subsequent amendments by recognizing that it set up a regime of
campaign finance regulation based upon four principles:

enforceable disclosure

provisions, public financing of presidential races, limits on contributions and limits on

spending.6
At the controls of the regulatory structure FECA created was an independent

administrative agency designated as the Federal Election Commission (FEC). The FEC
1 Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972).
2 Bradley A. Smith, Unfree Speech: The Folly of Campaign Finance Reform (Princeton: Princeton UP,
2001) 109.
3 Frank J. Sorauf, “What Buckley Wrought,” IfBuckley Fell: A First Amendment Blueprint for Regulating
Money in Politics, ed. E. Joshua Rosenkranz (New York: The Century Foundation Press, 1999) 12. See
also Herbert E. Alexander and Brian A. Haggerty, The Federal Election Campaign Act: After a Decade of
Political Reform (Washington D.C.: Citizens’ Research Foundation, 1981) 11.
4 Kenneth J. Levit, “Campaign Finance Reform and the Return of Buckley v. Valeo” The Yale Law
Journal 103 (1993) : 471.
5 Anthony Corrado, Beyond the Basics: Campaign Finance Reform (New York: The Century Foundation
Press, 2000) 9.
6 Smith 32.
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was given the authority to enforce the new variety of enacted FECA regulations. These
regulations were extremely broad in scope and were designed to prevent both the

corruption and appearance of corruption by large financial contributions to political

campaigns and reduce campaign costs in an effort to level the political playing field and

encourage competition.7 These purposes were augmented by the Revenue Act of 1971
and the tax incentives it gave to taxpayers making political contributions, and the
enactment of a tax check-off box on individual tax returns to designate tax money to be

given to publicly subsidize presidential general election campaigns.8
In leveling the playing field to encourage competition, the congressional enactment of

FECA and especially the subsequent 1974 amendments
...creat[ed] a whole new regulatory structure.... For the first time
Congress adopted a commanding plan to restrict all the transactions in a
campaign’s finance.... Moreover, it established a pioneering program of
public funding for all aspects of the presidential campaigns, and it created a
regulatory agency to oversee its reforms.9

Additionally, the experience with the FECA in the 1976 and 1978 elections and
dissatisfaction with the burdens the law placed on political debate and effective political
campaigning gave rise to further amendments in 1979.10

These later amendments

reduced the reporting requirements and gave greater leeway to state and local political

party committees to participate in presidential election campaigns.11 They also allowed
parties to spend unlimited amounts of money on grassroots activities such as partyCorrado 10. See also Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 116
S. Ct. 2309. 2312 (1996) and Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25-27 (1976).
8 Alexander and Haggerty 11; 21-22. Specifically, the Revenue Act of 1971 provided for a 50% tax credit
against federal personal income tax for political contributors or a deduction for the amount of contributions.
Both credits and deductions were subject to maximum limitation amounts and the deduction provision was
eliminated in 1978. However, the Act also established a tax check-off provision to provide a public
subsidy to presidential candidates that is still in effect.
9 See Sorauf, “What Buckley Wrought” 12.
10 Sorauf, “What Buckley Wrought” 12.
11 Sorauf, “What Buckley Wrought” 12.
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building, buttons, bumper stickers, brochures, posters, local party offices, yard signs,

voter registration activities and get-out-the-vote drives. These funds were not considered
contributions to federal candidates under FECA’s 1979 amendments because they were

raised for purposes other than express advocacy and did not urge the election or defeat of
a particular candidate for federal office. This grassroots party activity eventually was
given the name of soft money and the ability to raise this soft money outside the

parameters of FECA have become a rallying point for pro-reformist criticisms of the
•

current elections system.

10

As discussed, the specific goals of the FECA provisions were to regulate various
types of donors including individuals, political action committees (PACs), party

committees, corporations, national banks and foreign nationals. However, FECA went
beyond mere regulation of corporations, national banks and foreign nationals by

completely proscribing any contributions by these entities or individuals.
An analysis of individual donors under FECA is problematic because an

individual may be engaged in various types of contribution activities. For example, a
donor may be contributing to a candidate for federal office, contributing to their own

campaigns when they are seeking federal office, or making political expenditures that are
not directed to any particular candidate.

Currently, FECA limitations on individual contributions to candidates for federal

office may be generally summarized as follows: $2,000 per election to a candidate for
political office ($1,000 maximum in a primary election and $1,000 maximum in a general
election), $20,000 per year to a national party committee, $5,000 per year to a PAC and

12 Smith 35.
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$5,000 per year to a state party committee.

The aggregate limitation on individual

contributions in any given year may not exceed $25,000.13

Candidates themselves are not limited in any way in making independent
expenditures to their own campaigns for public office using their own personal resources,
unless they are presidential candidates agreeing to accept public financing in exchange
for agreeing to such limitations. If they do choose to accept public funding, they are

limited to a $50,000 cap on contributions to their own campaigns from personal

resources.

Public funding for these presidential candidates comes from a voluntary

check-off that is placed on individual income tax returns allowing tax payers to elect to

contribute $3.00 of the income taxes paid by them to a public fund for presidential
candidates. Those candidates that have elected to accept public funding are then eligible

to receive monies from the public campaign fund once they have raised at least $5,000 in

contributions of $250 or less in each of twenty states. Candidates then receive a dollarfor-dollar match up to the $250 for each contribution received.

14

The expenditures made by individuals, groups and political parties, other than
those made in coordination with a political candidate, are considered independent
expenditures and are outside of the reach of FECA limitations.

As long as such

expenditures do not advocate the election or defeat of any candidate there is no limitation

upon the amounts that may be expended—although any amounts collected must not
violate FECA contribution limitations. Examples of such expenditures would be general
advertisements about a candidate taken out in radio, newspapers or magazines. FECA

13 See Corrado 12; Smith 33.
14 See Corrado 14; Smith 33.
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had originally limited these amounts to $1,000 per person but these limitations were
invalidated by Buckely}5

The current FECA limitations placed upon PAC contributions are split into two
categories depending on whether the PAC is classified as a multi-candidate PAC. To

receive multi-candidate PAC status the committee must be registered with the Federal
Elections Commission for a six month period and receive contributions from at least
fifty-one donors during that same period. Additionally, multi-candidate PACs must make

contributions to at least five federal candidates. Multi-candidate PACs may contribute a
per year maximum of $5,000 per election to a candidate, $5,000 to other PACs, $15,000
to national party committees and $5,000 state and local party committees. PACs that do

not qualify for multi-candidate status may contribute a per year maximum of $1,000 per
election to a candidate, $5,000 per election to other PACs, $20,000 per year to national

party committees and $5,000 per year to state and local committees.
Party Committees may contribute $5,000 per year and per election to candidates
for the United States Congress, and national party committees and national senatorial

campaign committees may give $17,500 per election per year to candidates for the United

States Senate. Additionally, a state party committee may donate up to $5,000 to National
Senate candidates and $5,000 to PACs.

The scholarly literature examining the development of FECA is abundant. One
helpful approach to aid in gaining a general understanding about FECA s development
over time was undertaken by Professor Frank J. Sorauf.16 He traces the time period from

15 See Buckley 81-82; Corrado 15-19; Smith 34-35.
16 See Sorauf, “What Buckley Wrought” 11-62.
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FECA’s enactment through the modem day by dividing it into “three eras. ”17 He terms

the first era as the era of adaptation and dates this era from 1974 to 1984. Professor
Sorauf begins his description of the first two years of this era, 1971 and 1972, as the “era
of FECA ...that never happened.”18 As observed by Professor Sorauf, the “imposing
regulatory edifice never went into effect” because “great chunks of it fell to the Supreme
Court’s assault in Buckley v. Valeo in 1976.”19 Interestingly, the language employed by

Professor Sorauf in his characterization of FECA and the Supreme Court’s Buckley
decision highlights how contentious the issue of campaign finance reform continues to
be, as evidenced by his description of FECA as a commanding plan establishing a

pioneering program that fell to an assault by the Supreme Court. However, that does not

detract from the value of his overall historical analysis of FECA.

After discussing the first two years of FECA, Professor Sorauf identifies the true
starting date of the first genuine era of FECA as beginning with the elections of 1976 and
continuing through 1984. He describes this period as a time of innovation as participants
in the campaign financing process adapted to the provisions of FECA not invalidated by

Buckley. To support his classification of this period as one of innovation and adaptation,

Professor Sorauf refers to the growth of PACs and the various strategies employed by
participants in the political process to innovate around and adapt to the FECA limitations.
For example, Professor Sorauf identifies one adaptation mechanism of the first
period as the emergence of a shift of PAC strategy from the use of electoral strategies to

legislative strategies.

Legislative strategies employ the technique of making campaign

17 See Sorauf, “What Buckley Wrought” 11-62.
18 Sorauf, “What Buckley Wrought” 12.
19 Sorauf, “What Buckley Wrought” 12.
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contributions to candidates identifying with a PAC’s particular ideology or agenda.

These contributions are made indiscriminately to both incumbents and challengers.

However, this strategy proved to alienate those eventually elected to office when
contributions were made to their opponents.

In the mid-1980s, an electoral strategy

began to be employed by PACs that entailed making contributions targeted to those
candidates that were likely to win their bids for political office.20 This electoral strategy

was aimed at increasing the likelihood that the candidates receiving the PAC
contributions would in fact become or remain office holders.

Another technique developed during the period of innovation and adaptation was
the technique of bundled contributions. Bundling involves a tactic by which an interest
group solicits contributions and requests that the contribution checks be made payable

directly to specific candidates but mailed to the interest group. The interest group then
gathers the solicited checks together and delivers them bundled to the candidate.

By

adopting this approach the interest group is able to receive political credit for large and

meaningful contributions while the ability of the general public to trace these bundled

contributions is minimized.

Also, the advent of coordinated expenditures took place. Both state and national
political parties are allowed to make expenditures on behalf of individual candidates to

federal office in coordination with the candidate.

For example, parties may conduct

polls, finance media expenses, and research opposition positions.

While the money

raised to make these coordinated expenditures must comply with FECA contribution
limits, the expenditures are not capped by FECA.

20 Sorauf, “What Buckley Wrought’' 14.

Under the original FECA terms
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invalidated by Buckley these expenditures would have been limited to $10,000 per
candidate in a House general election and the greater of $20,000 or two cents times the

state’s voting-age population in a Senatorial general election.21

Professor Sorauf identifies a second era of FECA that he calls the era of stability
lasting from 1985 through 1990.

Sorauf characterizes this five year period as a “less

innovative era” that “slipped quietly into place” being marked by “[b]oth stability and

pragmatism.” In this second era the number of PACs remained relatively constant while
incumbents raised money with “vigor...[and]...aggressiveness” and “maintaining the
status quo was the order of the day.” Sorauf concludes that during this second era no

significant changes or innovations occured.22

Professor Sorauf simply calls the third era of FECA “the 1990s.”

Here, an

inevitable erosion of stability occurred as the consequence of policy deadlock and
legislative gridlock.

Incumbents became entrenched resulting in a strong and vocal

movement advocating term limits. In 1990, redistricting occurred after the census was
taken and a national movement to oust incumbents began to occur.

This movement

resulted in an erosion of incumbency control and created a new competitiveness for

elective office placing FECA, once again, into the spotlight. It is during this third era that
Sorauf sees the primary emergence of the two biggest concerns of modem day pro

reformists: soft money (discussed above) and issue advocacy. Sorauf concludes that the
emergence of these two vehicles of FECA avoidance produced an invigorated impetus by

pro-reformists to call for reform.

23

21 Corrado 14-15; 32-34.
22 Corrado 15.
23 Sorauf,44What Buckley Wrought” 16-19.
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The emergence of issue advocacy is viewed as especially problematic by pro
reformists. The interest groups that were prohibited by FECA contributing to candidates

directly devised a process to influence voters and operate free from FECA regulations by
engaging in issue advocacy.

This issue advocacy approach involved operating large-

scale advertising campaigns that attacked the records of the candidates without urging
voters to vote for or against a specific candidate. This type of advocacy did not fall
within the parameters of FECA and was expressly permitted by Buckley.

The FECA and the arena of campaign finance in which it operates is extremely
complex and multi-faceted, and engaging in the type of summary set out above raises the

risk of criticism based upon superficiality. However, to put the purpose of this thesis into
context it is necessary to provide at least a broad overview of FECA and this section of
Chapter Three has been geared to providing that overview.

Buckley24
“...I often wonder whether we do not rest our hopes too much
upon constitutions, upon laws and upon courts. These are false hopes;
believe me, these are false hopes. Liberty lies in the hearts of men and
women; when it dies there, no constitution, no law, no court can save it;
no constitution, no law, no court can even do much to help it. While it lies
there it needs no constitution, no law, no court to save it.”
—Learned Hand

The concern of Learned Hand identified above seems to have special relevance to
the question of whether the Supreme Court is the proper repository for ensuring the
existence of the variant of liberty involved in the reform debate the simultaneous
existence of democratic elections and free speech. As this thesis clearly demonstrates

there are contrary positions taken as to whether the American elections mechanism
24 The Buckley decision was rendered on January 30, 1976, and is as much debated twenty-five years later
as it was at the time rendered.
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currently ensures the existence of liberty.

Shortly after the passage of the 1974

amendments to FECA, a group of plaintiffs who believed liberty was being threatened by
FECA challenged the constitutionality of its major provisions as violating the First and

Fourth Amendments to the United States Constitution, as well as violating the related

provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 as amended in 1975.25

The Court

issued forth two hundred and ninety-four pages consisting of five separate opinions that
basically

rewrote the rules governing congressional and presidential campaign

fundraising and spending.26

The Buckley plaintiffs included Republican Senator James Buckley of New York,
liberal activist Stewart Mott, Democratic presidential candidate Eugene McCarthy, the

1976 McCarthy Committee for a Constitutional Presidency, the Conservative Party of the
State of New York, the Mississippi Republican Party, the Libertarian Party, the New

York Civil Liberties Union, the Conservative Victory Fund and Human Events, Inc. and

the American Conservative Union. 27 As this list illustrates, these individuals and groups
came from a broad spectrum of the American political landscape that often advocate

diametrically opposed viewpoints.

The Buckley plaintiffs were challenging what one

court called “...by far the most comprehensive reform legislation passed by Congress
concerning the election of the President, Vice-President and members of Congress.”

The leading defendant in the case was the then Secretary of the Senate, Francis R. Valeo,

25 Buckley 90. Specifically, the petitioners contended that certain provisions of Subtitle H of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954, as amended in 1975, were unconstitutional because of discrimination in violation
of the Fifth Amendment due process clause. See Alexander and Haggerty 21-22.
26 Levit 472.
27 Levit 472. See also Buckley 7-8.
28 Buckley 7. United States Supreme Court quoting the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.
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and the Clerk of the House, Comptroller General, Attorney General and the Federal

Elections Commission were also named as defendants.29
Essentially, Buckley upheld FECA’s limitations on individual, group and political
committee contributions to candidates, disclosure provisions and public subsidies of

presidential campaigns while invalidating expenditure limitations placed on candidates
and individuals. 30

At the core of Buckley is the balance of first amendment rights

protecting free speech and associational rights against the power of the legislature to
n i

enact laws designed to protect the integrity of the elections system.

The choice of the

Court to accept the Buckley case for judicial review clearly indicates its awareness of

both the existence and importance of the unique and inherent tension that exists in
America between free speech rights and democratic elections.
At trial, the circuit court adjudicating the Buckley case approved virtually all of

the challenged FECA provisions by justifying the restrictions as conduct-related rather

than speech-related.

32

The trial court’s decision focused primarily on the Literal Model

of Speech and approached the issue of constitutional definition by employing an analysis
that identified a dichotomy between conduct and speech—contributions and expenditures

were simply considered conduct rather than speech. As a result, the far-ranging FECA
regulations enacted by Congress were permitted.

The trial court viewed FECA

limitations as being a simple limitation that imposed restrictions on the transfer and use

of money and material resources. As a result, the restrictions were not viewed as limiting
first amendment speech because, if they limited speech at all, the limitations were not

29 Alexander and Haggerty 25.
30 Tribe 1133.
31 Alexander and Haggerty 25.
32 Levit 472.
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direct speech limitations but only incidental speech restrictions. As might be expected in
the hotly contested arena of campaign finance reform, the trial court’s analysis employing
the simplistic Literal Model to test FECA’s constitutional validity gave rise to a challenge

by anti-reformists.

When the Buckley issues reached the United States Supreme Court, the FECA
limitations on individual expenditures and contribution limits were found to impose
direct and substantial restraints on first amendment speech. These restraints were found
to exist because of the modem day realities of effective campaigning that requires large

sums of money to engage in the type of mass media campaigns that are necessary to any
successful bid for political office.

The Buckley court recognized that modem day

political speech is fueled by money and any limit on the flow of that money necessarily
implicates the First Amendment.

As a result, any governmental regulation must be

sensitive to the free speech implications that arise from that regulation and the

importance of the regulation will be balanced against the constitutional importance of
free speech.

Further, the Court found that FECA’s direct and substantial restraints

implicated core first amendment political speech rights and as a result they engaged in the

highest and most exacting level of judicial scrutiny to review, assess and balance the
competing interests and to determine the constitutional validity of the challenged

provisions.

After engaging in a long analysis, the Court concluded that the contribution limits
did pass constitutional muster but the expenditure limits, apart from the voluntary limits

imposed on those agreeing to accept public subsidies, ran afoul of the First Amendment
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guarantees of free speech.33

In the Court’s view the importance of spending and

contributing were distinctly different in the arena of campaign finance.34
Contribution Limits: The Court held that contribution limits do give rise to First

Amendment concerns but the corruption or the appearance of corruption of the

democratic process invokes a sufficiently important governmental interest to support
FECA’s contribution limitations, and justifies governmental intrusions into this area of

protected first amendment activity.35

According to the Court, “[t]o the extent that large

contributions are given to secure political quid pro quo's from...[candidates]...the
integrity of our system of representative democracy is undermined.”36

The Court

believed that if campaign contributions are sufficiently large enough to lead to quid pro

quo corruption—the exchange of money for specific action or inaction—then both the

integrity of the elections system as well as its appearance of fairness are jeopardized.
Applying this concern to the FECA contribution limitations, the Court found the
•

•

•

•

•

restrictions imposed to be within acceptable constitutional parameters.

37

It based this

decision on the belief that since individual contributions only express general support for

a candidate the FECA limitations impose only marginal restrictions on the ability of a

candidate to campaign, and if a candidate needs more campaign money he or she is free
no

to raise additional funds from more people.

The Court found a contribution to be a

33 Tribe 1133; Alexander and Haggerty 12; 22; 25. It is important to note that in addition to invalidating
FECA expenditure limitations, the Court also held that FECA structured the FEC in an unconstitutional
fashion in light of the requirements of the appointments clause of Article II, section 2 of the Constitution,
based upon the mechanisms employed in dividing the responsibility for administering campaign finance
legislation between the House, Senate and the General Accounting Office.
34 E. Joshua Rosenkranz, Introduction, IfBuckley Fell: A First Amendment Blueprintfor Regulating Money
in Politics, ed. E. Joshua Rosenkranz (New York: The Century Foundation Press, 1999) 2.
35 Smith 34; Tribe 1137.
36 Buckley 26-27.
37 Smith 34.
38 Buckley 21-22.
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mere signal of support having little speech value and what little speech value was
implicated did not depend on the size of the contribution. The Court also found that

corruption was more likely to occur in the arena of contributing and large contributions
could give rise to tacit political debts.39

Finally, the Court did not feel that FECA

contribution limits, in and of themselves, undermined to any material degree the potential
for robust and effective discussion of candidates and campaign issues by individual

citizens, associations, the institutional press, candidates and political parties.

Expenditure Limits:

40

Unlike the contribution limitations identified above,

FECA’s expenditure limits did not survive Buckley.

The Court first rejected the

corruption prevention rationale as being a permissible governmental purpose to limit
expenditures. The Court did not believe that these restrictions were justified to prevent

political corruption because individuals are able to monetarily support a candidate
without expressly advocating the candidate’s election to political office. As a result, the
means chosen by FECA would not really address this problem.41 However, the more

important basis for the Court’s decision involved its conceptualization of the purposes of

the First Amendment in the framework of American Government.
First, the Court rejected the trial court’s reliance on the use of a money/speech
dichotomy (a Literal Model approach) to resolve the constitutionality issue because the

Court did not feel that the expenditure of money spent in a campaign could be separated
from its speech component:

...[t]his Court has never suggested that the dependence of a
communication on the expenditure of money operates itself to introduce a
non-speech element or to reduce the exacting scrutiny required by the First

39 Rosenkranz, Introduction, IfBuckley Fell 2.
40 Buckley 20.
41 Tribe 1141.
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Amendment.... Virtually every means of communicating ideas in today’s
mass society requires the expenditure of money. The distribution of the
humblest handbill or leaflet entails printing, paper, and circulation costs.
Speeches and rallies generally necessitate hiring a hall publicizing the
event. The electorate’s increasing dependence on television, radio, and
other mass media for news and information has made these expensive
modes of communication indispensable instruments of effective political
speech.42
Secondly, the Buckley Court recognized the importance of ensuring robust public

debate in the political campaign process as evidenced by its statement that “[discussion
of public issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates are integral to the

operation of the system of government established by our Constitution.”43 This integral

component is manifested by what the Court describes as a “profound national
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust,

and wide-open....”

The Court finds expenditure limitations to be a barrier to far-

ranging open and robust debate in that providing only the freedom “to engage in
unlimited political expression subject...to a ceiling on expenditures” is like “being free to

drive an automobile as far and as often as one desires on a single tank of gasoline”45 —it
is only a mirage of freedom. The Buckley Court held that spending limits violate the First

Amendment by constraining the amount and depth of political information candidates

and other political advocates can convey to voters, as spending limits amount to
“substantial and direct restrictions on the ability of candidates, citizens, and associations

to engage in protected political expression....”

The Buckley court held that spending

does have an important speech value that is more akin to direct speech because every

42 Levit 472, quoting Buckley at 16 and 19.
43 Mutch 14.
44 New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
45 Buckley 19, n. 18.
46 Buckley 58-59.
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dollar spent will actually increase the number of issues discussed, the depth of their

exploration and the size of the audience reached. Further, corruption was held not likely
to occur in the area of expenditures because candidates are unlikely to be corrupted by

their own spending or by the spending of others not involved in their campaigns.47

However, the Court’s finding that no constitutionally sufficient purpose to support

the governmental regulation of expenditures existed detracts from the core philosophical
argument that Buckley really addresses. As one reform scholar writes, Buckley

...rais[ed,] as a constitutional matter[,] one of the oldest conflicts
in Anglo-American political thought, that between liberty and equality:
between those who wanted no restrictions on the political use of wealth
and those who wanted to retard the tendency of unequally distributed
wealth to become the basis for a similarly unequal distribution of political
influence. Normally, philosophical disputes such as that between equality
and liberty remain well below the surface of public discussion, but in the
48
mid-1970’s they defined their terms of congressional and court debate.

Although the Buckley Court found that corruption or the appearance of corruption would
justify the restriction of some types of campaign activities, it rejected any notion that

equalizing political opportunity or influence is a constitutionally permitted goal, as “the
concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order

to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment.”49
The Court distances itself from any evaluation of equality in the democratic political
process by simply focusing on constitutional limitation as opposed to the constitutional

equalization of the political elections system. As will be evident in the examination of

reform arguments in Chapter Four, this concern about political equality is what really lies

47 Rosenkranz, Introduction, If Buckley Fell 2.
48 Robert E. Mutch, Campaigns, Congress, and Courts (New York: Praeger, 1988) 33.
49 Buckley 48.
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at the core of the many pro-reformists’ belief in the need for campaign finance reform

and their objection to the Buckley decision
To bring this brief examination of the Buckley decision to a close, it is interesting

to note that the Court has adopted Meiklejohn’s view of the First Amendment about
protecting the free discussion of governmental affairs.50 However, the Court does not go
as far as Meiklejohn’s belief that the protection of governmental affairs is the only

purpose of the First Amendment. The Court is willing to give the First Amendment a
broader reading than Meiklejohn, but not as broad as the other two branches of

government

at least when it involves placing limitations on campaign expenditures.
Post-BwcAr/ey Cases: Relevant U.S. Supreme Court Decisions

The campaign finance reform debate has continued after Buckley, waxing and
waning as new issues arise concerning Buckley ’5 application to campaign activity. As a

result, a brief examination of some of the major developments is appropriate to place this
investigation in a current context.

The first yost-Buckley examination concerning the constitutionality of campaign
contribution limitations came in the 1981 case of California Medical Association v.
Federal Election Commission.*1

constitutionality of

Here, the Supreme Court specifically addressed the

FECA limitations on contributions made to political action

committees by individuals and groups.

An unincorporated association, the California

Medical Association, challenged FECA restrictions that prohibited it from making any

contributions greater than $5,000 to any multi-candidate political committee. Relying on
the reasoning established in Buckley, the Court determined that since Congress could

50 See Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966).
51 California Medical Association v. Federal Elections Comm’n, 453 U.S. 182 (1981).
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constitutionally limit contributions to campaigns, there was no First Amendment

violation in limiting contributions to political action committees by unincorporated
associations.

As a result, the California Medical Association was not being prohibited

from making an expenditure. Instead, it was merely being made amenable to regulations

concerning the making of a contribution. The Court found that FECA limitations, as
applied in this case, did not infringe upon first amendment speech protection because

they were not regulating constitutionally protected political advocacy, but instead were
regulating mere speech by proxy.

SO

Another major post-Buckley case involving the constitutionality of reform
measures is Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley

in which the Court

invalidated $250 contribution limits imposed on individual contributions to committees
that were formed to support or oppose ballot measures. The Court found the limitations
to be an unconstitutional interference with both associational rights and free speech

rights.

The limitations placed on the contributions were found to impair freedom of

expression because they had the effect of limiting individual expenditures, and were
contributions to committees formed to favor or oppose ballot measures—not candidates.
As a result, the corruption prevention rationale used to support limitations in Buckley has

no application because ballot measures are distinguishable from candidates and the
prevention of corruption is not a sufficient justification to infringe upon essential First

Amendment rights.54

52 Buckley 196; Tribe 1138.
53 Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981).
54 Citizens Against Rent Control 299-300; Tribe 1139-1140.
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In Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc.,55 the
Court took up the issue of whether independent expenditures by incorporated political

associations were constitutional. At issue was the constitutionality of a FECA provision
that prohibits a corporation from using treasury funds to make independent expenditures.

The Court found that the provision was not based upon any compelling justification for

infringing protected speech and invalidated it as an unconstitutional provision.
In the 1985 case of Federal Election Commission v. National Conservative
Political Action Committee,56 the Court struck down a limitation on expenditures by

political action committees. The provision prohibited a political action committee from

spending more than $1,000 on behalf of a presidential candidate who had chosen to

receive federal campaign financing. Relying on Buckley, the Court struck this limitation
because it prohibited an expenditure that was made by a PAC acting independently of a
candidate.

Most recently, in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC,
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the United States

Supreme Court was presented with a challenge that asked the Court to review whether the
entire FECA structure as modified by Buckley should be declared unconstitutional. The

Court declined to examine this issue and instead limited its consideration of the case to a
consideration of whether the Missouri contribution limits for statewide races had been set

too low. This case generated interest because the Missouri limits were capped at higher
limits than those allowed for federal races under FECA, and it was believed that the
Court, with almost a completely new membership roster than at the time of Buckley,

might use this case to completely reexamine the constitutionality of reform measures.
55 Federal Election Comm’n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
56 Federal Election Comm’n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480 (1985).
57 Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC. 119 S. Ct. 901 (1999).
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However, the Court merely ruled that the state’s interest in setting the contribution limits
at the specific levels they chose was not supported by an adequate government interest

and the limits were invalidated accordingly.
This short summary of post-Buckley cases is by no means comprehensive and was
not intended to be so. However, it does give a flavor of some of the steps the Court has

taken after the Buckley decision, and it is important to note that the Court membership,
save Chief Justice Rehnquist, has completely changed since the Buckley decision was
handed down. As a result, the direction of the Court’s next step in the campaign finance

reform debate is anything but certain.

‘I
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Chapter 4
A First Amendment Analysis of Reform Positions

This chapter applies the methodology developed and discussed in Chapter

Two to analyze some of the positions and arguments taken by those engaging in the
campaign finance reform debate. As discussed in Chapter One, the various positions

and arguments in the campaign finance reform debate are frequently advocated by

their proponents, and criticized by their detractors, seemingly without any awareness
or cognition of their viability in a constitutional sense.

However, it is this

constitutional foundation that necessarily underlies all of the argumentation because

the basis of that which is being commented upon—campaign finance reform
measures—cannot escape the gravitational pull of the Buckley case. The participants
in the debate leap forward to grandiose discussions about the effectiveness of reform

measures and engage in continuous speculation about the development of new and

different reform measures while always being drawn back into the chaos of the main
issue of constitutionality.

The debaters have simply suffered from the lack of a

coherent methodology to guide them. As a result, they frequently lose their way in

understanding the full range of positions that form the foundations of the

argumentation offered in support of or opposition to reform. It is time to take a step
back in the campaign finance reform debate to shed some light on this issue through

the methodology developed in this thesis.
For example, consider the approach taken by one pro-reformist scholar,

Professor Ronald Dworkin. He was asked to author an essay that considers what

regulatory regimes built around expenditure limits would be attractive, effective and

constitutional if one assumed that Buckley had been overturned and expenditure
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limits were not deemed automatically unconstitutional.1 Here we see the wish of so

many pro-reformists—an overturning of Buckley. This wish is so strong that the
author was asked to write an essay that simply wishes Buckley out of the way and

leaps to the promised land of reform free of Buckley's pull.

However, even in the make-believe world that Dworkin’s assignment creates
by requesting that he ignore Buckley and simply assume it away—Buckley reemerges.

It is clear that Dworkin understands his assignment but he takes the inevitable step
back when he begins his examination by identifying what he terms the “strongest case
for Buckley 's ruling that expenditure limits are unconstitutional.”2

Dworkin

constructs this strongest case out of what he terms a faulty assumption concerning the
best way to realize and protect democracy. He calls this faulty assumption the
democratic wagerJ and describes it as proceeding from the viewpoint that the

protection of democracy is best obtained by forbidding government to limit or control

political speech in any way.
Placing Dworkin’s conceptualization of the democratic wager on the

campaign finance reform spectrum is easily done. However, it occupies a position far
short of the strongest case for the Court to rule that expenditure limits are

unconstitutional.

The resting place of the democratic wager is not the extreme of

anti-reformist thought—freedom of speech as a near absolute. Dworkin s assertion
that the “most powerful arguments...[in Buckley's]... fawn

proceed from the

theoretical basis of the democratic wager as the representation of the strongest

1 See Ronald Dworkin, “Free Speech and the Dimensions of Democracy,” ed. E. Joshua Rosenkranz
(New York: The Century Foundation Press, 1999) 63-102.
2 Dworkin 66.
3 Attributing the naming of this assumption to the Jurist Learned Hand.
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argument for invalidating reform measures does not take into account the existence of

either the Liberty Model (Model 5) or the Full Protection Model (Model 6). This is

not to suggest that Dworkin intentionally offers up a straw man to serve as the
strongest anti-reform argument.

Instead, the misunderstanding may stem from the

lack of a cogent methodology to adequately assess the positions of anti-reformists and
the failure to recognize that more absolute or greater encompassing anti-reform

positions exist.

In any event, Dworkin’s characterization of the democratic wager

places it squarely within the Political Speech Model (Model 4). The reference to the

absolute protection of political speech is immediately recognizable as Meiklejohn’s
conceptualization of the First Amendment that extends absolute constitutional
protection to political speech.

Dworkin identifies what he sees as a paradox in the democratic wager and
highlights this paradox by asking the following question:

“How can it improve

democracy to prevent government from restricting political speech when government
believes that the restriction will itself improve democracy?”4

Unfortunately, this

paradox immediately takes the path of argument down a means-end approach. The

utilitarian roots of the argument are easily recognizable in that it focuses on achieving
a societal good— improving democracy. However, the approach leaps past the core

issue of constitutional meaning to focus on democratic vitality. It is clear that to
refute Buckley, one must resist the temptation to examine what is good for democracy

and instead focus on what is allowed or forbidden by the Constitution vis-a-vis the

First Amendment.

Further, Dworkin’s paradox proceeds from an implicit

unarticulated assumption that ignores the Supreme Court s role as part of the

4 Dworkin 66.
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government. Granted, it is true that Congress and the executive branch have decided
that FECA restrictions will improve democracy as amply evidenced by their passage

of FECA. However, the Supreme Court is a part of government and if it is viewed as
being neutral on the issue of what is good for government in favor of being primarily

concerned with what is constitutional under the First Amendment, Dworkin’s

paradox becomes misplaced in a discussion of Buckley. The Court’s role as part of

the government is not primarily to decide what will improve democracy. Instead, it is
limited to passing on what is permitted by the Constitution, or as one scholar
described:

“The courts are...specialists in the field of constitutional limitation.”5

Sometimes what is good may also be prohibited. As a result, the only path out of the
conundrum is through reforming the Constitution by amendment—not by judicial
fiat.

Dworkin also argues that Buckley proceeds from a theory of democracy that
views the current political arrangement as being designed merely to enforce the will

of the majority. In contrast, Dworkin offers an alternative conception of democracy
that he describes as both more ambitious and understanding.

It conceptualizes

democracy as a partnership of collective self-government in which all citizens are
given the opportunity to be active and equal partners. This view of Democracy and

its ramifications for free speech and campaign finance reform place it in the

Equalizing Model (Model 1).

Of necessity, it views the First Amendment as a

positive grant of power to be employed by government in diffusing power throughout
society.

Of course, Buckley explicitly rejects this viewpoint in its denouncement of

5 Thomas Emerson, Toward A General Theory of the First Amendment: A Unique Examination ofthe
Nature of Freedom of Expression and its Role in a Democratic Society (New York. Random House.
1966)31.
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the suppression of some speech to enhance the speech of others.”6 This thread of

Dworkin’s argument places its emphasis on the left side of the campaign finance
reform spectrum focusing on the jewel of democratic elections and the good reasoned

temptation to restrain communication.

Although he professes to see freedom of

speech as a fundamental human value that must balanced against the needs of

democracy, Dworkin quickly balances away free speech in favor of what he views as
the most effective approach for achieving the best democratic process.

Dworkin

desires to equalize the political power structure to make it egalitarian, but this
argument has no relevance to the concerns of Buckley.

Buckley is centered on

constitutional validity and not the improvement of democracy or the democratic
process—that is the role of Congress.

In contrast, Professor Lillian BeVier has created a large body of anti-reformist
scholarly literature and draws directly and approvingly from the theory of the
•

democratic wager and its foundation in Meiklejohn’s theory of the First Amendment.

7

BeVier recognizes that initial Supreme Court cases addressing the regulation of

speech in America focused primarily on determining what type of testing mechanisms
to utilize in analyzing the constitutionality of speech regulation, and to what specific

type of factual circumstances these testing mechanisms might apply.

8

The testing

mechanisms to which Be Vier refers form the basis of the Literal Model of Speech

(Model 3). But like most other reform scholars, BeVier does not attempt to validate a

6 Buckley 48-49.
7 See Lillian R. BeVier, “Campaign Finance Reform: Specious Arguments and Intractable Dilemmas?’
Columbia Law Review 94 (1994) : 1258-1280; Be Vier, “The First Amendment and Political Speech.
An Inquiry Into the Substance and Limits of Principle,” Stanford Law Review 30 (1977-78). 299o58,
and Be Vier, ’’Money and Politics: A Perspective on the First Amendment and Campaign Finance
Reform,” California Law Review 73 (1985): 1045-1090.
8BeVier, “Campaign Finance Reform” 1258-1260.
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speech/conduct dichotomy approach as being a proper method of analyzing reform
measures. Be Vier realizes that such an approach would be too facile and would be

unable to take meaningful and proper account of the full range of issues that must be
considered to arrive at a proper method of constitutional definition in the area of

campaign finance reform.9

In one article, BeVier discusses the post-BwcA/ey Supreme Court case of
Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce,10 which BeViers describes as revisiting
the Buckley decision to address the question of whether the First Amendment permits

legislatures to regulate campaign spending on the ground that governmental

regulation of speech actually promotes the purpose of a system of free expression”
[emphasis added].11

BeVier examined, through the lens of Michigan, whether the

“First Amendment is appropriately conceptualized as a source of power to enact
legislation that proponents claim will ensure a well-functioning deliberative process
among political equals.”12 As will be discussed, the components of the Equalizing

Model (Model 1) and the Liberty Model (Model 5) are intermingled in BeVier’s
construction of the issue present in Austin.
First, BeVier identified one of the most quoted phrases of Buckley, a phrase
that embodies the core of the constitutional approach used by the Court in Buckley:

9 However, these approaches do occur. Consider one adherent to the Literal Model of Speech, Judge
Skelly Wright. Wright defends judicial deference to refonn laws in principle and finds that political
expenditures and spending should not be conceptualized as pure speech, but rather as a form of
conduct related to speecli, and as a result the laws regulating such activities should not be invalidated
under the First Amendment. Obviously, Wright's pro-reformist approach has at its core a blanket
adoption of the Literal Model of Speech (Model 3) approach. Wright makes a simple distinction
between political spending and contributing and pure first amendment speech. In essence, Wright
argues that refonn legislation deals with conduct—not speech. See J. Skelly Wright, Politics and the
Constitution: Is Money Speech?” Yale Law Journal 1001 (1976): 1005-06.
10 Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
11 See BeVier, “Campaign Finance Reform” 1258.
12 BeVier 1258.
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‘"Neither political equality nor enhancement of democratic dialogue is a permissible

legislative goal under the First Amendment, at least if the pursuit of either entails
‘restricting] the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the
relative voice of others. ,,,13

As is readily apparent, this constitutional approach

rejects any conceptualization of the First Amendment as a positive grant of power to

government.

Additionally, it rejects the use of the Equalizing Model of Speech

(Model 1) to support using the First Amendment as a mechanism or a justification for
active government involvement, through campaign finance legislation, to create

and/or maintain a well-functioning political process among equals.

Instead, BeVier

argues that Buckley correctly conceptualized the First Amendment as a restraint on

government that would only allow campaign finance legislation, at least in terms of

expenditure limitations, to be permissible in the face of corruption or to address the
problem of the appearance of corruption.

However, BeVier criticizes the Austin

decision as a retreat from the Buckley holding in that FECA limitations on

independent expenditures of corporations were upheld as constitutional limitations.
BeVier sees this ruling as enlarging the reach of legislative limitations beyond
Buckley's original pronouncement to limit the prevention of corruption or the
appearance of corruption.14

To better flesh out the affirmative grant of power versus negative restraint

aspect of constitutional interpretation, it is helpfill to look at an advocate of a
viewpoint that is contrary to that of BeVier. Professor Cass Sunstein proceeds from

the point of view that “campaign finance laws... promote the purpose of the system of

13 BeVier 1258, quoting Buckley 48-49.
14 BeVier 1259.
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free expression, which is to ensure a well-functioning deliberative process among

political equals.”15

Sunstein believes that governmental “[e]ffbrts to redress

economic inequalities, or to ensure that they do not translate into political

inequalities, should not be seen as impermissible redistribution....

Instead [they]

should be evaluated pragmatically in terms of their consequences for the system of

free expression.”16

The roots of Sunstein’s argument are not difficult to find. He adheres fully to
the Equalizing Model of Speech (Model 1) and affords to speech very little protection
from governmental regulation if that regulation is geared to reduce and eliminate
political

inequalities.

Further,

Sunstein fully and enthusiastically embraces

conceptualizing the First Amendment as a positive grant of power to government that
allows it to take affirmative steps to ensure a well-functioning deliberative process
among political equals. Sunstein’s approach encompasses the belief that the “key to

fulfilling the ultimate purposes of the [F]irst [A]mendment is...to make certain that
public debate is sufficiently rich to permit true collective self-determination.”

Of

course, this incorporates some aspects of the Marketplace of Ideas Model and its
attempt to enrich public debate, but it goes a step further by allowing this purpose to

be fulfilled by extensive and intrusive government regulation.

It is important to note that Sunstein also brings in elements from the

Full Protection Model of speech to justify the protection of a system of expression. At
first blush this seems to cast the Sunstein position in a different light than it really is

15 Cass R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1993) 84.
16 Cass R. Sunstein, “Free Speech Now,” The Bill ofRights in the Modern State, ed. Geoffrey R. Stone,
etal. (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1992) 255; 292.
17 Sunstein, “Free Speech Now” 1258, n. 2, quoting Owen M. Fiss, “Free Speech and Social
Structure.” Iowa Law Review 71 (1986): 1405, 1408-11.

67
because it seems to encompass a far-ranging protection of expression and views the

First Amendment as extending this protection to a broad spectrum of speech that

includes conduct. However, Sunstein quickly subordinates this protection to the right
of government to ensure democratic elections, and for Sunstein those assurances are

made real by equalizing participation even if that means placing limitations on
expression.

In other words, Sunstein gives facile approval of the recognition of a

broad system of expression but transports that broad protection to the left of the
campaign finance reform spectrum to justify affirmative governmental action to

restrain communication and equalize the democratic process through good reasoned

restraints on speech.
Another attempt to put a new spin on a long established Model of Speech was

undertaken by Professors Frederick Schauer and Richard H. Pildes.

Schauer and

Pildes formulate an argument that rejects the use of a special classification
mechanism to place election related speech into a different First Amendment category

than other types of speech.

1R

In essence, they reject both Meiklejohn and Buckley's

adherence to the Political Speech Model (Model 4). However, the term they use to
refer to the Political Speech Model is “the rhetoric of exceptionalism.” Schauer and

Pildes offer the following definition of exceptionalism:
According to electoral exceptionalism, elections are (relatively)
bounded domains of communicative activity. Because of this
boundedness...it would be possible to prescribe or apply First
Amendment principles to electoral processes that do not necessarily
apply throughout the domain of the First Amendment. If electoral
exceptionalism prevails, the courts, in evaluating restrictions of the

18 See Frederick Schauer and Richard H. Pildes, “Electoral Exceptionalism.” IfBuckley Fell: A First
Amendment Blueprint for Regulating Money in Politics, ed. E, Joshua Rosenkranz (New York: The
Century Foundation Press, 1999) 103-120.
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speech that is part of the process of nominating and electing
candidates, would employ a different standard from what we might
otherwise characterize as the normal, or baseline, degree of First
Amendment Scrutiny.19
As clearly evident, there is nothing novel in Schauer and Pilde’s

conceptualization of elections as bounded domains through which the Court might
choose to create special rules to evaluate the propriety of governmental regulations in
a First Amendment sense.

It is simply the Political Speech Model carving out a

special arena of speech for protection and placing political speech in this arena.

However, Schauer and Pildes reject the electoral exceptionalism approach to First
Amendment interpretation and do not afford to political or election speech any
absolute quality deserving of specialized constitutional protection.

Instead, they

conclude that election specific pro-reform measures should not be viewed as being

automatically contrary to the First Amendment.
To support this position, Schauer and Pildes point to other governmental

regulations of political or electoral speech that has been upheld by the Court such as

curtailing political speech occurring on government property, in the broadcast media,
in public schools or engaged in by government employees.

Schauer and Pildes

believe the factor that has traditionally controlled the Court’s First Amendment
interpretation has, historically speaking, been the institution being regulated and not

the fact that political speech was involved.

20

As a result, they reject the idea of an

absolute view (like the Political Speech Model and Meiklejohn’s view) and describe
such a conceptualization as an “off the rack” conception of political speech.

19 Schauer and Pildes 105.
20 Schauer and Pildes 111.

In
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essence, Schauer and Pildes argue that elections do not in any important way, nor

should they, differ from any other areas of first amendment regulation.

Another approach to First Amendement interpretation in the campaign finance
reform debate is one taken by Professor Burt Neubome.21 Neubome draws freely

from multiple free speech Models by picking and choosing from their principles to

support his pro-reform argument.

This approach, as so often utilized in reform

arguments, makes it somewhat difficult to follow the constitutional course of
Neubome’s beliefs. However, by utilizing the campaign finance reform spectrum to

chart the path of Neubome’s argument, a great degree of clarity may be obtained and
the premises underlying his positions become amenable to a fuller understanding.

Neuborne begins his argument by agreeing with what he identifies as the
,,22

“crucial First Amendment principle on which Buckely is said to rest.”
• •

•

9^23

principle is “the constitutional right to speak vigorously on political issues.”

That
As a

result, Neubome seems to agree with the Buckley Court’s reliance on the Political

Speech Model (Model 4) and its focus on the protection of political speech under the
First Amendment. Neubome approvingly refers to the Court’s Buckley decision as
formulating a free speech principle that has as its heart:

.. .respect for the inherent dignity of an autonomous speaker. Once an
individual (even a foolish or hateful individual) makes an autonomous
decision to speak, the free speech principle trumps most countervailing
regulatory values.24

21 See Burt Neubome, “Soft Landings,” IfBuckley Fell: A First Amendment Blueprint for Regulating
Money in Politics, ed. E. Joshua Rosenkranz (New York: The Century Foundation Press, 1999) 169 184. ‘

22 Neubome 170.
23 Neubome 170.
24 Neubome 172.
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Here, Neubome’s recognition of the basic components of the Liberty Model

of Speech (Model 5) is clearly discernable by his identification of the heart of the free
speech principle as respect for the inherent dignity of an autonomous speaker.
Neubome extends liberty value to the speaker’s autonomous decision to speak and

this autonomous decision, in a first amendment sense, takes precedence over
countervailing governmental interest in regulation. Neubome attaches value and first

amendment protection to an individual’s decision to speak and the speech is clearly of

value because of its importance to the speaker. However, after recognizing the broad
purpose of the Liberty Model’s speech protection, Neubome immediately tacks hard
to portside and refines his argument, eventually reaching the conclusion that

overruling Buckley and implementing far-ranging reform measures would not be a

violation of the liberty protection afforded to individuals under the First Amendment.
As a result, Neuborne at once embraces the Liberty Model in principle but then

immediately seeks to restrict it in practice.

To justify this de facto restriction, Neubome formulates two primary

premises: first, “uncontrolled, massive political spending stops being pure speech [at

some point] and becomes an exercise in power,” and second, “many—perhaps
most—participants in an uncontrolled campaign spending process are simply not
autonomous speakers.”

In an effort to explain his premises and his sudden shift

from the far right of the campaign reform spectrum to the far left, Neubome pauses
briefly in the middle of the spectrum to interpose an argument based upon the Literal
Model of Speech (Model 3).

25 Neubome 172.
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First, Neuborne relies on the Literal Model’s conduct/speech dichotomy to

reject any conceptualization of campaign spending as speech: “because the act of

spending money ultimately leads to speech does not make it speech.”26 To support
this position, Neuborne makes use of an analogy that correlates campaign expenses to
the expenses of a newspaper in an effort to demonstrate that government intrusion

into other areas of protected first amendment activity is considered constitutional.
Specifically, Neuborne poses the following question:

[I]f 1 own a newspaper, the wages I pay to my reporters are
intended, ultimately, to generate speech. But the act of paying those
wages is a form of conduct subject to government regulation...even
though the wages make possible the publication of my newspaper.
From a First Amendment perspective, why should spending money on
political campaigns be different from spending money on reporter’s
wages? (emphasis added.)
Neuborne uses this analogy to make the point that the Court has allowed
governmental regulation of other activity that may lead to the exercise of protected

first amendment activity, but the thing being regulated is not protected first
amendment activity.

The analogy is open to criticism on many levels, but one

revealing criticism might be to invoke Meiklejohn’s viewpoint into the discussion.

Mieklejohn might respond to Neuborne that his analogy is inapplicable because it
confuses the infringement of a Fifth Amendment protection regarding a liberty

interest (right to contract) with an inffingment of a First Amendment protection of
liberty interests (freedom of the press). The donation or expenditure of campaign
funds equate directly with speech—money is speech in the campaigning context.
Whereas, the payment of wages to employees who gather together information and

26 Neuborne 173
27 Neuborne 173.
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assemble it to be disseminated does not equate to speech—instead it is a mere conduit
to speech.

Additionally, Neubome proceeds to critcize Buckley for “collapsing campaign

spending and campaign speaking into a single first amendment activity” and believes
the Court did so because the FECA limits being challenged were “absurdly” low and

amounted to “de facto” limits on political speech.28 Once again, Neubome employs
the Literal Model of Speech to argue that governmental regulation of campaign

spending, at some point, is not unconstitutional speech infringement but only
constitutional conduct infringement.

Neubome does not believe that massive

spending is geared toward the right to speak but toward the right, through

amplification and repetition, to dominate discourse and thereby prohibit other

speakers from having their message heard.
Neubome goes on to reject any conceptualization of candidates and donors as

free-standing autonomous individuals making their own decisions about how to
advance their political ends. Instead, Neubome believes that candidates are forced to

seek greater and greater contributions because their opponents are doing so. As a
result, candidates are forced to appease contributors and potential contributors by

making political decisions that thwart their autonomy.

On the contribution side,

Neubome sees what he describes as a “subtle undercurrent of bribery and extortion

in the contribution process that defeats any claims of autonomous contributions.
Instead, the contributions are better thought of as pay-offs made on a non-altruistic

basis and the candidates themselves are not autonomous speakers but fierce
competitors for resources in their drives to stay in power. In effect, Neubome rejects

28 Neubome 173.
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any attempt to validate the Liberty Model’s protection of speech by again finding that
its importance to the individual is simply not present because no true autonomous

speech exists due to the perverting nature of fundraising.
It is fitting to close this Chapter by examining the position advocated by one

of the newest members of the Supreme Court, Justice Clarence Thomas. His opinion

as to constitutional interpretation is certainly important in that he is likely to
participate in any re-examination of Buckley.

In ColoradoRepublican Federal

Campaign Committee v. Federal Election Commission,29 the Court considered the
issue of whether FECA limitations fixing limits on political party expenditures being

spent in coordination with specific candidates violated the free speech protections of
the First Amendment. Justice Thomas found that any attempt to make a distinction

between contributions and expenditures “lacks constitutional significance.”

30

Justice

Thomas makes clear that he proceeds from the Political Speech Model (Model 4) and
interprets the First Amendment as extending protection to political discussion as
evidenced by his adoption of former Chief Justice Warren Burger’s language from

Buckley:
Contributions and expenditures are two sides of the same First
Amendment coin...both involve core First Amendment expression because
they further “[d]iscussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications of
candidates...[which is]...integral to the operation of the system of
government established by our Constitution.”31

Thomas adopts the Political Speech Model of speech and believes that both
contribution and expenditure limits infringe upon political expression and as such

violate the Constitution.
29 518 U.S. 604 (1996).
30 Colorado .
31 Colorado quoting Buckley 14, 241.
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This Chapter has examined some reform positions using the campaign finance

reform spectrum to guide the analysis. There are many positions to examine and the
approach used by each is often unique in some way. However, the campaign finance
reform spectrum is usually beneficial to assist in charting the various positions and to

function as an aid to understand some of the theoretical underpinnings of each

position.

r
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Chapter 5
Conclusion

“... [I]n all your actions, look often upon what you would have, as the thing that directs all
your thoughts in the way to attain it.” (emphasis added.)
—Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan
This thesis has examined the constitutional ramifications of campaign finance

reform in light of the First Amendment. This is because the First Amendment cannot be
ignored—it is what we have and the focus of the debate upon what we would have blurs

the real issue:

is campaign finance reform constitutional?

The maxim of Thomas

Hobbes quoted above appears to have been taken to heart by pro-reformists as their

participation in the campaign finance reform debate is geared to attaining what they
believe is needed.

Indeed, there is a vast amount of quantitative data and empirical

research to support their position on the need for far-ranging campaign finance reform.
However, anti-reformist thought claims to embrace the First Amendment and

views it as a proscription of far-ranging campaign finance reform. Assuming that anti
reformist beliefs are spawned by honest and genuinely held opinions about the meaning

of the American constitution and not merely motivated by a legal means to get what they

would have—the absence of reform—then we have a troubled debate that lacks a
common language.

To again use Professor Tribe’s quote set out in Chapter Two, the

issue centers around “...gaining...a deeper appreciation of the very great difference
between reading the Constitution we have and writing the Constitution some of us might

wish to have.”' It is also important to remember that the founding fathers left the well

1 Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law (Mineola: The Foundation Press, Inc., 1988) iii.
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full and the quill sharp, and the reform wished by some may be obtained by amending the
Constitution to achieve those desires instead of reading those desires into it.

This thesis has examined the basic issues at the core of the reform debate and
attempted to fully bring those issues into the open for observation. A methodology for
examination has been developed to cogently examine the various positions on the
constitutionality of campaign finance reform to add a degree of clarity to the muddied

waters of the debate.

While not every possible argument was examined nor every

argument examined in full, an attempt has been made to provide an example of how the

campaign finance reform spectrum might be employed to analyze various viewpoints and

to compare and contrast them with other viewpoints. The purpose of attaining this clarity
is to assist in helping the participants in the debate understand and appreciate the views of
others who adhere to competing viewpoints, and to help them direct their debate to

properly address the concerns opposing viewpoints raise. Attempting to sort through the

vast literature on this subject makes clear the vital need for this work.

Limitations of the Study and Suggestions for Further Research

The major impediment to this study is the vast amount of literature and
viewpoints relating to this topic, and the diversity of sources upon which one must draw
to create a cogent methodology for accurately examining the issues and corresponding

problems involved.

To successfully pull together the subjective with the objective, the

normative with the empirical, and in the end achieve some semblance of coherency is a

daunting challenge.

However, in the vast maze of this information the foundations of

constitutional theory, and in turn first amendment theory, have existed from the
beginning just waiting to be recognized, identified and clarified. This thesis is only able
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to provide a general overview of the issues and approach envisioned in order to examine
the topic. Each area examined in the previous chapters is amenable to further research

and clarification, and the following is suggested:

1) Further research into the specific historical and political foundations of

approaches to constitutional interpretation such as natural law, positivism, utilitarianism
and other approaches;

2) Further research should be undertaken to greater refine the precise definitional

elements of the Models of Speech to allow for clearer and more distinct application in
comparing and contrasting different approaches to interpretation;
3) Further review of the literature is recommended to identify additional Models

of Speech that may be used to further clarify the Spectrum of Campaign Finance Reform

Thought.

1
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APPENDIX A

Spectrum of Campaign Finance Reform Thought

Democratic
Elections

Free
Speech

2

1

Equalizing
Model

Marketplace of
Ideas Model

Pro-reformists

A Good Reasoned Temptation
To Restrain Communication

5

3

4

Literal
Model

Political
Speech
Model

Liberty
Model

6

Full Protection
Model

Anti-reformists

Freedom of Expression
as a Near Absolute
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